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(Under the Direction of GABRIEL WILNER)
The modernization of EC Competition Law is discussed as a necessity on the European
Union. Its counterpart, the U.S. Antitrust Law system followed a different evolution. The
legislation, institutions and procedures remark the differences among these advanced
systems of market control. The role of the EC Commission, national authorities and
national courts of Member States will determine the elements to change. Its American
counterpart, the Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commission, and the federal courts,
developed the most effective and dynamic pathways for antitrust enforcing. The analysis of
both frameworks must consider several factors, other that legal factors. The relevance of
EC Competition Law must be observed in the context of new issues: EU enlargement,
external relationship with third states, extraterritoriality of EC law application, etc.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this work is to analyze the process of modernization of
competition rules in the European Community (EC, hereinafter), through a comparative
study of some procedural aspects of the antitrust law in the United States of America
(U.S., hereinafter). For the purposes of this study, I will analyze the main substantive and
procedural provisions in both legal systems.
The interest for this subject derives from a personal interest in the EC system, as one of
the most amazing integration processes in the world. At the same time, the opportunity to
analyze in a closer way the U.S. legal antitrust framework, through the attendance of a
legal program in the United States, determined my final decision to undertake a
comparative study of an extremely dynamic legal system. Analyzing the different
competition laws and the interaction among different actors in both legal stystems is a
challenging task for an individual not belonging to either one of these systems. The
results, however, are personally satisfactory, due to the relevance of these frameworks to
other regional and national competition systems.
The modernization of EC competition law system is not a novelty. The interest in
attaining a dynamic system is just as important to community and national enforcement
authorities as it is to community level discussions. The substantive rules are flexible
enough to allow different changes for EC competition dynamics; nevertheless, there are
several procedural issues that have been raised, particularly in relationship with the
capability and performance of the Member State enforcers.

1
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The US antitrust system is not an exception to facing procedural issues. Many significant
questions have been raised since the primal moments of the antitrust system. However,
the plural composition of this country, the contributions of the states, the development of
an efficient cooperation system, and the extensive federal jurisprudence in antitrust law
have developed the most sophisticated competition framework in the world today.
With this interest point in mind, this study will examine the following questions:
What are the main differences between EC competition law and U.S. antitrust law from
an institutional and procedural perspective, due to their different levels (Community level
v. national level, or federal level v. state level)?
What are the main differences between EC competition law enforcement in Member
States and U.S. antitrust law enforcement in states (Community courts v. national courts,
or federal courts v. state courts)?
How do their correspondent procedures work, according to their policies?
What type of administrative and procedure issues will face EC Competition Law and its
Member States given the various efforts of modernization (e.g. legal certainty, legal
consistency, and forum shopping through national authorities and national courts)?
What is the significance of the White Paper on Modernization of EC Competition Law?
How have the U.S. solved similar issues in the past (e.g. central authorities, allocation of
resources, extraterritoriality) and how will the EC solve them (e.g. use of precedent cases,
other jurisprudence model, guidelines, directives, opinions)?
This study will discuss the most relevant procedural issues of competition law in the U.S.
and EC systems. The first chapter reviews the basic and most relevant legal provisions
that establish the institutions in charge, the substantive elements, and the procedural
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criteria of the European Community and the United States of America competition
frameworks.
The second chapter examines the main procedural elements of the institutions in both
systems. As a means to determine the efficiency of these competition frameworks, an
emphasis will be placed on private enforcement within both systems.
The third chapter analyzes the modernization of EC competition law —the core of this
study—. In particular, the White Paper on Modernization of EC law is largely discussed.
As a precedent to the Commission’s modernization proposal, certain elements of U.S.
antitrust enforcement are considered.
Finally, personal observations concerning the EC modernization process and the
American antitrust framework are presented.

CHAPTER 1
STRUCTURE OF EC COMPETITION LAW AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
A comparative analysis must first establish the characteristics of the elements of
study. Accordingly, an overview of the legal competition framerwork of the European
Community and the United States of America competition systems will be presented.
Analysis will begin with EC competition law, followed by an examination of the U.S.
antitrust framework; this choice is purely discretionary.
A. Evolution of EC Competition Law and U.S. Antitrust Law
The antitrust systems in the EC and the U.S. have responded to the needs of their
respective societies at different times. Even if the American framework has largely
determined the structure of the European system, the evolution of each must be handled
separately. Each structure has been determined by several factors: the rise of a new
economic order; post-World War II movements; the advent of regional political alliances;
increased efforts to develop competition frameworks, etc.
EC competition law must be analyzed by considering the community goals in creating a
new European common market and the manner in which competition policy can help
achieve these goals. 1 Unlike the U.S. economy, which was largely integrated and
continental in scope at the time of the passage of the 1890 Sherman Act, the EC was
created in 1957 in order to establish a new European common market and to “promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a

1

Spencer Weber Waller Understanding and Appreciating EC Competition Law, 61 Antitrust L. J. 55, p.55
(1992).
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continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the
standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.”2
However, there has been a tendency to focus analysis of competition legal structures
under the U.S. umbrella. Although the U.S. framework is of great import, the EC
phenomenon must not be ignored as an extraordinary and protracted effort to coordinate
the competition systems of 15 countries. 3
1. European Community competition law
EC competition law and policy is a complex system which not only impacts
international business transactions on a daily basis, but also serves as an invaluable
source of comparative analysis of competition law. 4
Although it is widely accepted that EC competition law has it origins in the U.S.
occupation of Germany, is also true that the European liberal thought, which later
inspired the EC competition framework, preceded the U.S. occupation. The German and
Austrian experiences can be considered the initial framework for the EC competition
law. 5

2

Idem, at p. 55. Weber comments in this part the importance of article 2 EC Treaty, see infra note 12.
As Gerber mentions, “The tendency of those who think about competition law to focus predominantly on
the U.S. experience frames our enterprise. The U.S. experience tends to dominate though about competition
law throughout the world. It is the reference point for thinking about the entire phenomenon. Most scholars
and leading officials in competition law know something about that experience and can, therefore, relate
their own competition law decisions to it. European experience, on the other hand, tends to be
marginalized. Few, particularly in the United States, know much about it. As a result, there is little
recognition of its influence and its role. I suggest that this one-dimensional, U.S.-centered pattern of
perception impairs our understanding of international competition law today and obscures important factors
that are shaping its future development.”, David Gerber Europe and the Globalization of Antitrust Law, 14
Conn. J. Int’l L. 15, 15 (1999).
4
Supra Weber, n. 1, p.55.
5
For an extensive and deeper introduction to squash the myths about the origins of EC competition law, see
supra note 2, pp-18-24; also see David J. Gerber Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe:
Protecting Prometheus (1998).
3
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The post-war integration movement in Europe was crystallized in the Treaty establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community (hereinafter, ECSC Treaty). 6 This compromise
represented the first European agreement in this crucial economic area that responded to
the necessity of competition regulation.
Since the European Economic Community (EEC, hereinafter) Treaty specifically
provides for the common market competition policy in its articles, 7 the scope of this
analysis is limited to the successor of the EEC Treaty8 : the European Community Treaty
—neither the ECSC Treaty nor the EURATOM Treaty9 —. However, the EEC Treaty has
justifiably been the departure point of European competition policy for the last 47 years.
a. The fundamental Treaties
The first measure of competition policy adopted on a European basis was
incorporated in the Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and Steel
Community. 10 This gave jurisdiction to a ‘High Authority’ to deal with restraints on
competition within member states, whether or not they affected trade between member
states. 11

6

Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, signed on April 18, 1951 (also known as
the Treaty of Paris). Entered into force on 20 July 1952.
7
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (renumbered later as articles 81 and 82, by the Treaty
establishing the European Community).
8
The Treaty of Rome refers to the original Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (signed at Rome). This Treaty was signed together with the Treaty establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community (both treaties called the Rome Treaties). Entered into force on 1
January 958.
9
It must be mentioned that, due to the special provisions of the EURATOM Treaty, related to nuclear
energy, the competition policy previewed by the EEC Treaty, by virtue of Article 232 (2) does not apply to
this special sector; see Valentine Korah An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, Hart
Publishing, Oxford, 6th ed., 1997, p. 6.
10
Supra note 6.
11
Nick Gardner A Guide to United Kingdom and European Union Competition Policy, MacMillan Press,
Ltd. Great Britain, 3rd. ed. 2000, p. 139-140. As this author mentions: “[T] he formulation in that treaty of
an effects-based system which made prohibited practices void unless exempted by the competition
authority, owed a great deal to the outcome of the debate in West Germany which had led to the passing
there of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (1957).”

7
In order to avoid market distortions, Article 2 of the EEC Treaty established the common
market and provided for the progressive approximation of the economic policies of the
Member States. 12 Article 2 also defined the instruments that the Community had at its
disposal for the successful establishment of the common market. 13
The individual EC Treaty articles are often referred to as ‘primary legislation’. The more
detailed principles elaborated by the EC institutions are collectively referred to as
‘secondary legislation’. 14 With regard to competition, the EEC Treaty set out specific
relevant principles in Articles 2, 3, and 85 to 94. These rules applied to all areas of
economic activity unless other articles of the Treaty expressly provided otherwise. In
practice, few sectors of the economy were exempted. 15
According to Article 2 of the EC Treaty, the objective of the Community is to establish a
common market and progressively approximate the economic policies of Member States;
to promote harmonious development of economic activities; to ensure a continuous and
balanced expansion of the Community; to increase regional stability, to promote an

12

Art. 2, EEC Treaty.
Idem, Art. 3. These instruments were a defined number of common policies, guaranteeing free movement
of goods, persons, services and capital between Member States, and exceptional provisions which
established common policies in the agricultural and transport sections; however, the most important tool
was “[t]he establishment of a system which would ensure undistorted and free competition […]”, see Rein
Wesseling The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law, Hart Publishing, USA, 2000. pp. 15-22.
14
European Commission The impact of Community law on the domestic legal systems of the Member
States. Competition Law, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg,
1998, p. 11.
15
Notably, the coal and steel sector fell outside the scope of this Treaty, by virtue of specific provisions of
Article 232 EC Treaty. As the Commission mentions “[I] n principle, therefore, the coal and steel
undertakings escape to the EC competition rules and are subject to the ECSC rules [founded in Articles 65
to 67 of the ECSC Treaty]. This principle is, however, subject to two provisos. Firstly, it follows from the
ECSC Treaty that where a coal or steel undertaking deals in products other than those defined in Annex I to
the ECSC Treaty, it is not the ECSC Treaty rules which apply but the EC competition rules {Case 1/59
Macchiorlati Dalmas v. High Authority [1959] ECR 199.}. Secondly, upon expiry of the ECSC Treaty
[scheduled to expire in 2002], the coal and steel sector is expected to be governed by the EC Treaty rules.”
Idem, p. 11.
13

8
accelerated raising of the standard of living; and to develop closer relations between
Member States. 16
Article 3 establishes the different instruments that are to be used by the EEC to achieve
the objectives set out in Article 2. Among the different measures, the institution of a
system to ensure that competition in the Community is not distorted clearly establishes
the position of the Member States toward competition activities, throughout the EEC.17
This group of Articles was also nominated the “first chapter of the Common Rules”. 18
However, the most significant provisions of the EEC Treaty, relating to the promotion
and preservation of competition, are Articles 85 19 and 86 20 , which relate to anticompetitive arrangements between, and abuses of dominant positions by, undertakings.
The first forbids, as incompatible with the common market, collusion that may affect
trade between Member States and has the object or effect of restricting competition
within the common market. The second forbids the abusive exploitation of a dominant
position. 21 These articles constituted the substantive rules for competition law in the EEC.

16

D. M. Raybould and Alison Firth Law of Monopolies. Competition Law and Practice in the USA, EEC,
Germany and the UK, Graham & Trotman, UK, 1991, p. 197.
17
Idem, at p. 198.
18
See Wesseling, supra note 13, at p. 15.
19
Article 85(1) EEC Treaty provides:
“1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market […]”
Is important to mention that Article 85 and Article 86 were not amended by the Treaty of Maastricht, but
the Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered them.
20
Article 86 EEC Treaty provides:
a) “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so
far as it may affect trade between Member States.”
21
See Korah, supra note 8, at p. 2.
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The framers of the EEC Treaty also established some rules of procedure, in order to
enable the application of these substantive rules. However, when the EEC Treaty came
into force on 1958, the antitrust rules existed merely in skeletal form. 22 Articles 87 to 89
? also called the ‘procedural provisions’?

focused on the enforcement of the EEC

Treaty’s antitrust rules, but there was no expressed regulation or directive at that time.
Thus, by virtue of Article 88, 23 the charge of the administration fell on the Member
States’ authorities 24 , until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of
Article 87 EEC.
Article 87 25 of the EEC Treaty empowered the Council to adopt regulations and
directives required to define in detail the procedures applicable to competition matters,
entrusting the application of the same to the Commission. Thus, the Council authorized
the Commission to adopt supplementary procedural rules. 26 I will later describe in detail
the institutions and its respective functions in the EEC competition policy.
The Treaty of Maastricht 27 , which came into force on 1 November 1993, supplemented
the earlier treaties and created a European Union (hereinafter, EU). It added a common

22

See Wesseling, supra note 13, at p. 17.
Article 88 established: ‘Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of Art. 87, the
authorities in Member States shall rule on the admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted
practices and on abuse of a dominant position in the common market in accordance with the law of their
country and with the provisions of Art. 85, in particular paragraph 3, and or Art. 86.’
24
See Wesseling, supra note 13, at p. 16.
25
The original text of Article 87 (1) EEC Treaty was the following:
“1. Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council shall, acting unanimously
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, adopt any
appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86.
If such provisions have not been adopted within the period mentioned, they shall be laid down by
the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament.”
This article was soon expanded, due to Regulation 17/62, which established clear rules of procedure for
competition law. The current text will be reproduced later on.
26
The first piece of secondary legislation to appear pursuant to Article 87 was Council Regulation 17/62 (in
force from 13 March 1962). This set out in detail the powers and duties of the Commission in the field of
competition. I will examine it later on.
27
Treaty for the European Union, 7 February 1992, C.M.R. 25300.
23
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foreign policy, co-operation in the environmental and social areas, and the aim of
achieving a monetary union between the Member States. 28 Also, this treaty changed the
name of the EEC to the European Community. 29
Due to the dynamics on the European integration process, the Treaty of Amsterdam took
the major steps towards restructuring the institutions of the European Union, in 1997. An
important change brought by the Treaty of Amsterdam was the consolidation of the EC
and EU Treaties in two documents that renumbered the former articles of each one. 30
Thus, the Competition Rules mentioned before (i.e. the competition articles established in
the EEC Treaty) were renumbered: Articles 85, 86, 87 and 88 became Articles 81, 82,
8331 and 84 respectively. 32 I must state that the present work will be completely based on
the renumbered articles and their current text.
b. Regulation and Directives
In addition to the Constitutive Treaties (i.e. EC, ECSC and EURATOM), the
Community institutions perform different acts that constitute an important source of law,

28

Craig and de Búrca mention that “[u] ndoubtedly, the popular profile of the Community has been raised
more by the ‘Maastricht Treaty’ debate than by any previous development in the Community’s history,
even though some content that the Single European Act, with its revival of qualified-majority voting,
represented a more significant step for the Community in the process of integration. Perhaps, apart from the
detailed commitment to full economic and monetary union, the most obvious feature of the Treaty on
European Union was the institutional change it wrought, establishing a ‘three-pillar’ structure for what was
hence-forth to be called the European Union, with the Communities as the first of these pillars.”, Paul Craig
and Gráinne de Búrca EC Law. Text, Cases and Materials, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 27.
29
See Korah, supra note 8, at p. 1. This change was also a recognition of the reality that the activities and
competences of the former Economic Community ranged far beyond its original economic goals. See also
Christopher Vincenzi Law of the European Community, Financial Times Pitman Publishing, 2nd ed., Great
Britain, 1996, p. 8.
30
European Union Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1997.
31
The text of Article 83(1) (ex Art. 87(1)) now establishes:
“1. The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 81
and 82 shall be laid down by the Council, acting by a qualifies majority on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament.”
32
Article 12 of the Treaty of Amsterdam provided for a complete renumbering of the Maastricht Treaty in
accordance with a table of equivalences included in the Treaty’s annex.
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according to Article 249 EC Treaty. These acts constitute the EC secondary legislation,
which may take one of three forms: regulations 33 , directives 34 or decisions. 35
The power to elaborate and adopt such secondary legislation so as to ensure proper
implementation and enforcement of competition policy is set out in Article 83. 36
However, much of the detail of EC competition law is set out in a variety of regulations
adopted by the Council or by the Commission acting under powers that the Council has
delegated to it. 37
Notwithstanding the relevance of the tentative debates on interpretation of the basic
concepts of EC antitrust law in the initial years, the most important development in the
first decade of Community antitrust law was the adoption of the first enforcement
regulation: Regulation 17/62 (hereinafter, Regulation 17). 38 In this instrument, the Council
authorized in 1962 the Commission to undertake investigations and ensure compliance
with the Community competition rules, imposing penalties on offenders if necessary.

33

Regulations are directly applicable in national legal systems and apply throughout the Community in all
the Member States. Many have direct effect, conferring rights and duties on individuals who can rely on
them in the same way as domestic law in their national courts. Unlike national law, however, they have not
been passed by the national legislature. See Inns of Court School of Law European Community
Competition Law in Practice, Blackstone Press Limited, 2nd ed., Great Britain, 1999, p. 196.
34
Directives are often used for coordinating the laws of Member States, which are obliged to introduce new
legislation, redraft, or amend existing national legislation and administrative rules to conform to the
objectives of a directive. They may have direct effect in certain circumstances. Ibid, p. 196.
35
Decisions are administrative measures. Sometimes the Community institutions themselves are
responsible for implementing the treaties or regulations. They can make decisions binding on individuals,
firms or Member States. A decision usually requires the addressee to perform some action or refrain
therefrom. It also may confer rights or impose obligations on those to whom it is addressed. Ibidem, p. 196.
36
European Commission, supra note 14, at p. 13.
37
Examples of these Community regulations are: Regulation 17/62 [1962] OJ 13/204, [1959-62] OJ Spec.
Ed. 87, which sets up the means for the implementation of EC competition policy; Regulation 99/63 [1963]
OJ 226, O.J. Spec. Ed. 47, which governs the conduct of hearings; various regulations, known as ‘block
exemption’ regulations, which define the conditions in which exemption from the application of Article
81(1) prohibition may be presumed, and cover a variety of commercial arrangements including exclusive
distribution agreements, exclusive purchasing agreements and franchising agreements; Regulation 4064/89
on control of concentrations, OJ L 395/1 (corrected version published in OJ L 257/14, 1990). I will only
make comments about Regulation 17, due to the procedural nature of this work.
38
EEC Council Regulation 17 of 13 March 1962 [1962] JO 13/204 [1959-62] OJ Spec. Ed. 87.
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Thus, the Commission was able to order the termination of restrictive agreements and
abuses of dominant position in the common market and prevent their proliferation. 39
Later on, in 1989, immediately after the formal establishment of the internal market, the
Council adopted the most important legislative act in the antitrust law area after
Regulation 17: Council Regulation 4064/89 (hereinafter, Merger Regulation). 40 This
instrument provided the Community with the competence to control corporate mergers
and acquisitions (“concentrations”) of a “Community dimension”. 41 The Merger
Regulation formalised and completed the Commission’s competence to control the
processes by which undertakings merge, wholly or in part. 42
2. U.S. Antitrust Law
The antitrust laws of the United States of America are unique in scope of content
and rigor of enforcement. They have a background of more than 100 years, 43 but they are
in permanent evolution. 44 Their relevance has crossed North American boundaries: since
the

Second

World

encouragement?

War

many

industrial

countries

? often

with

American

have adopted legislation dealing with monopolies and restrictive

business agreements, and have begun to develop a body of case-law under their statutes. 45

39

Luis Ortiz Blanco EC Competition Procedure, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 5.
Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings
[1989] OJ L395/1.
41
See Wesseling, supra note 13, at p. 45.
42
Idem, at p. 45.
43
“Dissatisfaction with the common law’s protectionism and, more importantly, rising concern over
abusive practices by corporate giants in the second half of the 19th century led to legislation restricting the
power of the railroads and “trusts”. See Ernest Gellhorn Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell, West
Publishing Co., 3rd ed., USA, 1986, p. 15.
44
For a detailed analysis of the antitrust laws history, see Hans B. Thorelli The Federal Antitrust Policy:
Origination of an American Tradition (1955); William Letwin Law and Economic Policy in America: the
Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1981); Herbert Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy. The Law of
Competition and Its Practice. West Publishing Co., USA, 1994.
45
A.D. Neale and D.G. Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the United States of America. A Study of Competition
Enforced by Law, Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed., USA 1980, p. 1.
40
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However, the substantive provisions of the antitrust laws are few and brief; they are
contained in seven sections taken from three statutes ? the Sherman Act of 1890 46 , the
Clayton Act47 , and Federal Trade Commission Act 48 of 1914. The two latter statutes were
amended in important ways by subsequent measures, which will be mentioned below.
There are some other minor laws, but these three Acts contain the essentials of the
system. 49
a. Basic laws in the American antitrust system
The general objective of the Sherman Act, enacted in 1890 50 , was the promotion
of competition in open markets. 51 This instrument was enacted following a period of
rapid industrial development and increasing concentration in many industries —in
particular in the petroleum, tobacco, cotton oil, linseed oil and paper industries—. 52
Its passage resulted from concern aroused by the “vast accumulation of wealth in the
hands of corporations and individuals, the enormous development of corporate
organization, the facility for combination which such organizations afforded, the fact that
the facility was being used and that combinations known as trusts are being multiplied,
and the widespread impression that their power had been and would be exerted to oppress
individuals and injure the public generally.”53

46

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) as amended.
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-27, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) as amended.
48
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-58, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) as amended.
49
Idem at p. 3.
50
Altough it dates from 1890, it remains the core of the statutory regime. Every subsequent statute has been
an effort to expand on or refine its provisions. See John H. Shenefield and Irwin M. Stelzer The Antitrust
Laws. A premier, The AEI Press, 3rd ed., Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 15.
51
See Raybould and Firth, supra note 16, at p. 11.
52
Idem, at p. 11.
53
Earl W. Kintner and Mark R. Joelson An International Antitrust Premier. A Businessman’s Guide to the
International Aspects of United States Antitrust Law and to Key Foreign Antitrust Laws, Macmillan
Publishing Co., New York, 1974, p. 8.
47
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The Sherman Act can be enforced both in civil and criminal actions. 54 The possible
imposition of criminal penalties for antitrust violations 55 provides an accurate indicator of
the importance of the preservation of free competition in U.S. 56 However, its two
substantive sections, Section 1 57 and Section 2 58 , reflect its policies in very general terms.
Section 1 focuses on restrictive agreements (wrongful purposes or effects) while Section
2 examines the aggrandizement or misuse of monopoly power (exclusionary actions). 59
The approach adopted by these two sections of the Act towards the monopoly problem is
different, but it is clear that the means by which markets are controlled or competition
dampened is an indifferent matter. 60 In the end it is irrelevant whether a trade restraint
was accomplished by a contract or by some looser form of agreement, or even by the
sheer aggregation of market power. 61
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court summarized the two provisions of the statute as follows:

54

This is an important difference between the US antitrust enforcement system and the EC competition
framework: the latter does not prosecute criminally the transgressors of competition rules.
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With the enactment of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, offenses under the Sherman Act,
which had been misdemeanors, became felonies subject to 3 years of imprisonment and fines of up to
$100,000 for individuals and $1 million for corporations. 88 Stat. 1706 (1974). Gellhorn, supra note 43, at
p. 21.
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See Kintner and Joelson, supra note 53, at p. 13.
57
Section 1 provides:
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.”
58
Section 2 provides:
“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.”
59
See Gellhorn, supra note 43, at p. 22.
60
Idem, at p. 23.
61
Ibidem, at p. 23.
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“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, at the lowest prices, of the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to
the preservation of our democratic, political and social institutions. But even were that
premise open to question the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is
competition.”62
The Clayton Act63 is the second major antitrust statute of the United States, passed by
Congress in 1914, twenty-one years after the Sherman Act. 64 It was enacted by Congress
because of the sentiment that certain defects and omissions in the Sherman Act had to be
remedied if the competitive system was to retain its effectiveness. 65 Thus, nothwistanding
the sweeping and apparently all-inclusive prohibitions of the Sherman Act, new
legislation was thought necessary due to two factors: judicial refusal to find certain
conduct violative of the Act, and the recognition of additional anticompetitive conduct
that had not been considered detrimental before. 66
The Act, as amended, is directed at specific practices such as price discrimination, tying
arrangements and mergers. In this point, it is distinct from the broad language of the
Sherman Act which prohibits conspiracies or agreements in restraint of trade or
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Northern Pacific Railway v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
The main amendments to Clayton Act have been the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 and the Anti-Trust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980. See
Raybould and Firth, supra note 16, at p. 66.
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Idem at p. 66.
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See Kintner and Joelson, supra note 53, at p. 16.
66
Idem, at p. 16.
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conspiracies or attempts to monopolise or actual monopolisation. 67 Fixing certain specific
gaps of the Sherman Act, with the passage of this Act, was a reflection of the pragmatic
approach that has guided antitrust philosophy in the United States. 68
The Clayton Act declared four restrictive or monopolistic acts illegal but not criminal:
price discrimination —sales of a product at different prices to similarly situated buyers
(§2); tying and exclusive dealing contracts —sales on condition that the buyer stop
dealing with the seller’s competitors (§3); corporate mergers —acquisitions of competing
companies (§7); and interlocking directorates —common board members among
competing companies (§8). 69
The other important instrument, the Federal Trade Commission Act (hereinafter, FTC
Act), was passed in September 1914, two months prior to the enactment of the Clayton
Act. It is largely concerned with the setting up of the Federal Trade Commission
(hereinafter, FTC) and the mechanics of its operation. 70 The principal antitrust provision
is contained in Section 5 (a)(1), which declares: “Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.”71
Furthermore, the FTC Act prohibits unfair methods of competition (including those acts
or practices that violate the Clayton or Sherman Act) and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices (those acts beyond the reach of the former Acts, that can be reached by the FTC
under Section 5 if they have or are likely to have a substantial anticompetitive effect),
67

Raybould and Firth, supra note 16, at p. 66.
Kintner and Joelson, supra note 53, at p. 16.
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See Gellhorn, supra note 43, at p. 30.
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Raybould and Firth, supra note 16, at p. 77.
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In 1938 the Wheeler-Lea Amendment added the words “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” to Section
5 and the Section was again amended by the Magnusson-Moss-Warrant-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1975. Under the 1975 provisions, the original provisions relating to unfair or deceptive
methods of competition “in commerce” were extended to such activities if they “affect” commerce. Section
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which occur in or affect interstate or foreign commerce. 72 Thus, at the same time that it
laid down standards of conduct, the FTC Act created the agency to enforce those
standards. 73
B. EC Institutions responsible of competition law
The complexity of the structure of EC competition law system, due to the
different levels of integration (national and supranational), has originated most of the
procedural issues addressed by the modernization proposals. I will not describe in this
analysis the specific structure and function of each institution; rather, I will make a brief
mention of the EC bodies involved in the enforcement of competition rules and its
relationship with national authorities and national courts. 74
However, it must be noted that both the Commission and the competition authorities of
the Member States enforce competition laws in the European Union. 75 The EC courts, as
well as the national courts of the Member States, are responsible for reviewing the
decisions of the authorities. Likewise, the Member States delegate enforcement of the
competition laws to a central body, the national competition authority. The decisions of
the authority are, in turn, reversable by one or more national tribunals. 76

18 of the 1914 Act was also extended by the 1975 Act: the Commission is empowered to make rules
concerning unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. Idem, at p. 77.
72
Ibidem, at p. 78.
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Kintner and Joelson, supra note 53, at p. 18. I will mention later the structure and function of the FTC in
the US antitrust law enforcement.
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For a precise description of EC Competition Law Institutions, vid. Korah, supra note 8.
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“There are two main ways in which the competition rules are enforced. The Commission has been
empowered by regulation 17 to decide whether conduct infringes article 85 and 86 and to grant individual
exemptions […] The prohibitions in articles 85 and 86 also give rise to actions in tort in national courts.
Moreover article 85 (2) renders agreements that infringe that article void. The prohibition of article 86 may
also cause a transaction to become void on the ground that it is illegal.” Id. at 21.
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Barry E. Hawk, Laraine E. Laudati Antitrust Federalism In The United States And Decentralization Of
Competition Law Enforcement In The European Union: A Comparison 20 Fordham Int’l L. J. 18, 31
(1996).
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1. The Commission: the main enforcer of competition rules
Above all, it must be noted that the enforcement of community competition law is
shared between the Commission and the Community Courts (e.g. the European Court of
Justice —hereinafter, ECJ— and the European Court of First Instance —hereinafter,
CFI).77
The Commission has independent powers to ensure application of competition laws,
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, the Merger Regulation78 , Regulation 17 79 and other
secondary sources of EC competition law. Its final decisions are reached through a vote
of its members (twenty commissioners are the ultimate decision-makers in competition
cases). Nevertheless, this decision is reviewable by the CFI and the ECJ. Furthermore,
the Commission’s competition department —Directorate General IV or DG IV—
prepares cases on notifications, complaints or other means of learning of potential
violations. 80
The Commission is empowered by the Council to enact subordinate legislation granting
group exemptions from the prohibition of Article 81(1) and providing forms for notifying
agreements of when an individual exemption is required. Besides, article 9 of Regulation
17 gives it exclusive right to grant individual exemptions. 81 Moreover, Commission has
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The Competition Department of the Commission (Directorate General IV or DG IV) prepares the cases
and renders final decisions on claims, while the community courts can review the Commission decisions.
Id. at 31.
78
Supra note 40.
79
Supra note 38.
80
Located in Brussels and composed by 420 functionaries, subdivided into 7 directorates. See Hawk and
Laudati, supra note 76, at p. 32.
81
The procedures under Regulation 17 will be discussed later. However, the relevance of exemptions has to
be noted: “Not all agreements that perceptibly restrict competition and may affect inter-state trade are
prohibited. Some forms of collaboration restrictive of competition may have beneficial effects and are
capable of exemption by the Commission. By virtue of article 85(3) […] the prohibition in article 85(1)
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powers to obtain information from firms and to order undertakings to terminate an
infringement of Articles 81 and 82 and to impose fines. 82
2. European Courts
Originally there was a single Community Court —the ECJ— but in 1989 the
Court of First Instance (CFI, hereinafter), called the “Tribunal” in some Member States,
started to operate in competition and staff cases. 83 Its jurisdiction increased in 1993 and
199484 now includes state aid, dumping, and many other matters. It hears all direct
actions save for those brought by or against member states. 85
The ECJ and the CFI consist of judges appointed collectively by the Member States, but
in practice each nominates one judge and the others accept him or her. They also are
completely independent of their national governments, although they are appointed for a
renewable term of six years. There are now 15 judges in each court. 86
Under Article 225 EC Treaty, the CFI has unlimited jurisdiction to review competition
decisions of the Commission. It may cancel, reduce, or increase fines or penalties that the
Commission imposes. By its creation, the EC reduced the workload of the ECJ, although
some of its decisions have been appealed. 87

may be declared inapplicable to any agreements or category of agreements provided that they have certain
characteristics. They must contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods, or
promote technical or economic progress.”, See Korah, supra note 8, at p. 68.
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Idem, at 21.
83
The Court of First Instance was created by Council Dec. 88/591/ECSC, EEC and EURATOM, O. J.
1988, L319/1, and took up its duties in October 1989.
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Its general jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance all direct actions brought by natural and
legal persons was established by Council Decs. 93/350, O.J. 1993, L144/21 and 94/149, O.J. 1994, L66/29.
In addition, it has received jurisdiction in new areas under Reg. 4064/89 on the control of concentrations
(supra n. 40); Reg. 40/49 on the Community Trade Mark, O. J. 1994, L11/1; and Reg. 2100/94 on
Community Plant Variety Rights, O. J. 1994, L227/1. See Korah, supra note 8, at p. 19.
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Idem, at 19.
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Idem, at 19.
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Nevertheless, the appeal must be confined to points of law. Thus, the CFI “is perhaps intended to be less
‘judicially creative’ than the ECJ.” Robert McPeake European Community Competition Law in Practice
(Blackstone Press Ltd. 2nd ed. 1999).
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Under Article 230 EC Treaty, article 17 of Regulation 17 and article 16 of Merger
Regulation, the ECJ is granted with unlimited power for judicial review over the acts of
the institutions of the Community and, in particular, decisions of the Commission.
According to Article 234 EC Treaty, the ECJ can interpret Community law for the benefit
of national courts through a preliminary ruling procedure, on a limited basis: this
“Tribunal” merely interprets the law and allows the national court to apply Community
law to the facts. 88
C. US Antitrust institutional structure
The antitrust laws can be enforced in four different ways: by the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (hereinafter, Antitrust Division or Division); by the
FTC; by the state attorney generals, and by private parties. 89 Thus, parallel federal and
state court structures buttress their enforcement efforts. 90 I will refer in this part only to
the first three enforcers, since the private parties —stricto sensu— are not institutions. 91
It is important to stress that each type of enforcing action has contributed to the
development and effectiveness of the antitrust laws. This overlapping enforcement,
however, complicates understanding of the role of each enforcer. 92 I will briefly describe
the structure and functioning of these main federal and state enforcers.
1. Federal institutions
The Antitrust Division and the FTC share responsibility for the enforcement of
federal antitrust laws. These two governmental bodies coordinate their enforcement
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According to McPeake, “[t]his has disadvantages as a court that does not apply the law may not realise
how impractical some of its rulings are.” Idem, at 20.
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See Shenefield and Stelzer, supra note 50, at p. 24.
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See Hawk and Laudati, supra note 76, at p. 23.
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For a detailed description and dynamics of private parties as enforcers of antitrust laws, see Hovenkamp,
supra note 44, pp. 541-583.
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See Kintner and Joelson, supra note 53, at p. 19.
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efforts to minimize the potential of duplication of any specific task. In addition, the
federal courts have a broad grant of jurisdiction so that they can hear both federal and, if
certain requirements are met, state antitrust claims. 93
As the Antitrust Division is a division of the executive arm of the Federal Government
and the Federal Trade Commission is an administrative agency set up for specific
purposes, the two agencies naturally differ in their procedures and methods. 94
Nevertheless, the risk or overlapping functions derives from the law itself: technically,
only the Division has authority to engage in public enforcement of the Sherman Act. 95
But at the same time, the FTC may bring actions challenging unfair methods of
competition under §5 or the FTC Act, which has been interpreted to include everything in
the Sherman Act, plus a few practices that are not covered by this Act. 96 Furthermore, the
Division and the FTC have concurrent authority to enforce the Clayton Act. 97
Both agencies have established effective means to solve these barriers to enforcement.
Since 1949, there are well-established liaison arrangements between the Division and the
FTC to ensure that the concurrent jurisdiction of the two bodies runs smoothly and
duplication is avoided. 98
Under this mechanism, a staff member of either agency wishing to initiate an
investigation must contact the liaison office whose clearance is needed before work
begins. 99 In this clearance procedure, if both agencies are found to be pursuing the same
inquiry, they must decide which will handle it based generally on considerations of
93

Hawk and Laudati, supra note 76, at p. 23.
See Neale and Goyder, supra note 45, at p. 373.
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See Hovenkamp, supra note 44, p. 533.
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Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 694, 68 S.Ct. 793, 800 (1948).
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expertise, staff availability, etc. 100 However, if the matter involves likely criminal activity
it will generally be referred to the Division, since the FTC does not have criminal
jurisdiction. 101
Also, as a manner of determining the adequate procedures and to suggest certain ways of
actuation, either for lawyers, private parties, federal or state officers, both the Division
and the FTC occasionally issue written Guidelines, outlining their enforcement position
on various matters. 102
The Department of Justice is the nation’s principal law enforcement body. An Assistant
Attorney General who has responsibility for the overall policy of the Division heads this
office in charge of antitrust enforcement. 103 He serves directly under the Attorney
General. 104
Within the Division there are three main groups: (a) trial sections based in Washington,
dealing with particular investigations, Grand Jury hearings, court cases, and the
enforcement of judgments; (b) seven field offices across the United States performing the
same functions on a regional basis;105 and (c) specialists in Washington carrying out
technical functions essential to the general working of the Division. 106
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The field offices of the Antitrust Division are located in Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Cleveland,
Ohio; Dallas, Texas; New York, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and San Francisco, California.
The field offices often work in conjunction with the offices of the U.S. Attorney, which are also located
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The main activity of the Division is the enforcement of the Sherman, Clayton, WebbPomerene, Robinson- Patman, and the relevant portions of the Wilson Tariff Acts.
However, the Division also performs other important activities on antitrust enforcement:
issuance of guidelines for international operations and other issues 107 ; issuance of
Business Review Letters evaluating conduct contemplated by private parties; and
participation as amicus curiae in behalf of defendants. 108
Thus, the Antitrust Division’s enforcement is through the launching of investigations and,
if necessary, the subsequent pursuit of criminal or civil litigation. 109 It holds the sole
power to prosecute criminal antitrust violations and all federal antitrust actions in several
sectors, including banking, telecommunications, and rail and air transportation. 110 The
Division generally files criminal actions only for clear, intentional violations of the
law. 111 For civil investigations, it commonly issues Civil Investigative Demands, which
are subpoenas that can be issued to any person believed to have information pertaining to
the investigation and compels documents, oral testimony, or answers to interrogatories. 112
The FTC consists of five Commissioners appointed by the President, subject to Senate
confirmation for seven-year terms. The FTC has —amongst other responsibilities—
authority to enforce the substance of all the antitrust laws. However, it is the only agency
entitled to enforce the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which is wholly
107

Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶
13,109; Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures (1980), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) §13, 120;
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civil in nature. 113 With respect to the Sherman Act, the FTC has no direct enforcement
authority, but its authority to challenge “unfair methods of competition” under §5 of the
FTC Act 114 is interpreted to include all practices condemned under the Sherman Act. 115
Despite the large number of complaints that the FTC receives, it has discretion to initiate
any proceeding. In this sense, the FTC has its own procedures for collecting and
presenting evidence, generally governed by Section 5(b) of the FTC Act116 and the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act. 117
The structure of the FTC allows it to develop deep economic analysis and long-range
policy planning. It includes an Office of General Counsel118 , the Bureau of
Competition119 , and a number of Administrative Law Judges. 120 Altough the FTC
embodies a judicial arm for dealing with alleged breaches of the law subject to appellate
review by the federal courts, its primary task is to protect the consumer against unfair
business practices of all kind. 121
Besides the federal agencies, the role of the federal courts is vital in U.S. antitrust law
enforcement. These courts have the last word in antitrust cases, sustaining or rejecting a
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decision from the federal agencies: they have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
under federal antitrust laws. 122
The federal court system is composed of the Federal District Courts, twelve Circuit
Courts of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court. Each circuit has its own precedent
interpreting antitrust statutes; in the absence of a Supreme Court decision, only precedent
within their own circuit binds federal circuit courts. 123
Still, in a different situation, Federal Courts may have jurisdiction to decide antitrust state
claims originally filed in state court, if the defendant removes the case to federal court, as
allowed by federal laws. 124 Thus, pendent state claims, which are claims made under state
antitrust law arising out of the same facts or circumstances as federal claims, may be
removed to federal court along with federal law claims. 125
2. State institutions
State enforcement can be observed from two standpoints: enforcement of federal
laws and enforcement of state laws. Here, the Supremacy Clause of the Federal
Constitution is observed, but it must be remarked that nothing in the federal antitrust laws
even hints that Congress intended to preempt state and local law simply because that law
interferes with competitive markets (e.g. a state law inconsistent with federal antitrust
policy). 126
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Hence, in addition to the public agencies, states attorneys general have authority to
enforce federal antitrust laws, and at the same time, are empowered to enforce their own
state antitrust laws, most of which are similar to the federal statutes. 127 At this point, it is
also important to remark that similar to the cooperation between the Antitrust Division
and the FTC, since 1907, the state attorneys general coordinate their respective efforts
through the National Association of Attorneys General (hereinafter, NAAG). 128
The NAAG Antitrust Committee is composed of nine attorneys general who study
substantive antitrust matters and recommend policy positions to the attorneys general.
Another department of the NAAG, the Antitrust Task Force, created in 1983, is
composed of the principal antitrust attorneys from all fifty states; it coordinates proposed
joint antitrust actions among the states. 129
In addition, in 1989 Congress established the Executive Working Group on Antitrust,
consisting of the five Commissioners of the FTC, the Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust, and five representatives of the NAAG. Its main function is to serve as a forum
for exchanging information about investigations, discussing cooperative efforts, sharing
resources, and developing stronger working relationships federal and state levels. 130
Last, it must be mentioned that each state has its own court system (trial court, appellate
court and supreme court), in which state courts adjudicate antitrust claims based on state
law, but are not empowered to adjudicate federal antitrust claims. 131 Thus, because few
state judges are familiar with antitrust law, most state antitrust enforcers and private
127
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parties choose to file lawsuits in federal court and to assert state antitrust claims as
pendent claims. 132

131

General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 271 (1922), which stated that the right to
sue under Sherman Antitrust Act “is to be exercised only in a ‘court of the United States’ ”.
132
Hawk and Laudati, supra note 76, at p. 28. There are three methods by which a state can assert state
antitrust claims in federal court:
a) “a state has standing to sue under federal law as a private party, for damages, injunctions, where
the state itself has been injured as a purchaser of the goods or services which are the subject of the
antitrust violation (§§ 4 and 6 Clayton Act), or as parens patriae on behalf of one of its citizen
injured as result of a violation of the Sherman Act;
b) state attorneys general acting collectively can bring a multistate action in federal court;
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CHAPTER 2
PROCEDURAL EFFICIENCY OF EC AND US COMPETITION SYSTEMS
A. Relationship between EC Institutions, national authorities, and national courts
The debate on the procedural efficiency has different perspectives, depending on
the legal framework we are discussing. On one hand, the efficiency of the EC
competition law rules is determined by principles that guide the application of substantive
rules, either at community level or at state level (e.g. supranationality and subsidiarity).
On the other hand, the application of U.S. antitrust system is neither centralized nor
monopolized by a single judicial or administrative authority, but is comprised by a series
of inter-level cooperation forms among federal and state courts and authorities.
Due to the nature of the EC, the dynamics of competition law enforcement are unique and
dependent on several non-legal factors. The importance of both community and national
levels must be observed at every moment. Thus, there are two points of view to be
considered: that of the EC, and that of every Member State. Based on the principle of
supremacy of Community law, the EC has always taken the view that its law (e.g.
competition rules) takes precedence over any conflicting national law, whether or not the
national law is precedent in time. 133 At the same time, the Commission recognizes that
the Member Countries are better equipped to apply both their national competition law
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ENEL (6/64) [1964] ECR 585.

28

29
and that of the Community; this ensures more active participation by the national judicial
and administrative authorities. 134
Furthermore, the importance of the national level is stressed by the principle of direct
effect. Under this guideline, established by Article 189 EC Treaty, regulations are
directly applicable in the Member States, and no other type of community legislation is
described this way. 135 The ECJ held on this subject that individuals may use, in national
courts, Community laws that meet certain criteria. Thus, sometimes such laws may only
be used against the State (e.g. they impose no obligation on individuals), or may be used
by one individual to sue another or as defense to litigation (e.g.. they proscribe certain
conduct). 136
The importance of the subsidiarity principle has accelerated the Commission’s plan to
decentralize application of competition rules. This issue is not strange or harmful to the
notion of consistency of EC law; the division of competences on competition rules
enforcement is inherent to the nature of Articles 81 and 82. These provisions are
applicable only if agreements and restrictive practices have, or are liable to have, an
appreciable effect on trade between Member States. 137
Nowadays, the Commission is trying to secure the full involvement of national courts and
national competition authorities in the application of EC antitrust law. To that end, the
Commission has published a notice on co-operation between national courts and the
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Commission, 138 and is extending its contacts with the national authorities of the Member
States.
1. Commission’s role in competition procedures
The Commission has been called ‘the guardian of the Treaty’, according to the
provision of article 211 of the EC Treaty. This article entrusts the Commission with the
task of ensuring that provisions of the Treaty, and measures adopted by the Community
institutions for their implementation are observed. 139
According to national powers courts and authorities, the Commission, except as regards
Article 81 (3), does not enjoy a monopoly over enforcement of the Community
competition rules. However, since the 1960’s, the Commission, and specifically the
Directorate General for Competition (DG IV) has devoted considerable effort to this
activity. The result of this dynamic has been the generally recognized pre-eminence of
the Commission in this field, considering it as the guiding hand on Community
competition law. 140
Article 211 also provides the capability of the Commission to “have its own power of
decision” and to “exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the
implementation of the rules laid down by the latter”. Through this article, the
Commission is able to adopt decisions under Regulation 17, to ensure compliance with
the competition rules of the Treaty. The drafting of individual decisions, block
exemptions, regulations, and preparatory work for notices, are the main activities of the
Commission on EC competition policy. Nevertheless, the procedure of deciding whether
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or not an undertaking infringed community competition rules is perhaps the most
controversial task of the Commission, due to the substantial amount of human and
material resources devoted to this activity and due to the resentments of undertakings
whose interests may be affected. 141
In addition to this, the Commission is required to exercise its powers “in close and
constant liaison with the competent authorities of the Member States”. 142 The scope of
this obligation is to allow the national courts and authorities to be informed of the main
documents that are contained in the Commission’s files, concerning complaints,
applications in respect of agreements, requests for information, statements of objections
and replied from undertakings, administrative letters, etc. 143
The Commission also has the duty to advise or consult the authorities in the Member
States when it intends to carry out investigations in their territory; the national authorities
are obligated to assist the Commission during such investigations. Although the
Commission develops the investigation and procedures, the national authorities may be
called on to co-operate in the enforcement of decisions imposing fines. 144
Similarly, as means of communication between the Commission and the national
authorities, the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions (the
Advisory Committee, hereinafter) was created. This important body allows the Member
141
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States to be consulted prior to the adoption of final decisions on Article 81 and 82 cases
or of decisions imposing pecuniary penalties. 145 The Advisory Committee is also
consulted about both the adoption of block exemption regulations and general
competition policy documents. The Advisory Committee is composed by officials from
the various national authorities responsible for applying national and Community
competition law; each Member State designates and official to represent it. 146 Failure to
consult the Advisory Committee may constitute and infringement of a procedural
requirement in the application of the competition rules. 147
It is important to note that the Commission is an administrative authority that should not
be regarded as a tribunal: it is only an administrative body responsible for ensuring
compliance with certain rules in the public interest of the Community. The procedures
held by the Commission have different characteristics, and although they are
administrative in nature, they incorporate safeguards similar to those available in judicial
proceedings. 148 The general characteristics of some of the Commission’s proceedings in
competition matters and their correspondent decisions will be explained ahead.
2. National Authorities’ role in EC and national competition law
The national competition authorities of the Member States have the power to
investigate, make decisions, and impose sanctions. The national competition law rules of
each state are their main element of work, since its main task is to protect the internal
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national market of every country in the EU. 149 Their power, however, depends upon their
degree of autonomy from political influence. 150
The investigatory powers of Member States are more effective than those of the
Commission, due to practical factors: they can direct investigations against individuals
and sanction them for failure to cooperate; some of them can include imprisonment for
disobeying a court order; they have police powers, including the possibility to obtain
search warrants and three of them provide criminal sanctions for restrictive practices and
abuses of a dominant position. 151 The national competition authorities, in connection with
national judiciary bodies, are in charge of all criminal and non-criminal procedures.
Under Article 84 of the EC Treaty, the national authorities are empowered to apply
Community competition rules, but only until such time as the Commission decides to
initiate a procedure. 152 They are also obligated to demand their national legislative bodies
to enable legislation allowing them to apply Articles 81 and 82 and to establish which
national remedies apply. 153
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However, national authorities are skeptical about the benefits that Community
competition rules can bring to any procedure initiated in Member States. In fact, national
provisions can often be applied faster and to greater effect. 154 Besides, due to the
capability of the Commission to terminate any previous proceeding by filing its own
action, the national authorities are reluctant to initiate a proceeding under Article 81(1).
Moreover, they fear they will waste time and resources if the Commission can grant an
exemption under Article 81(3) after they have found a violation under Article 81(1). 155
Even if the Commission has been considering delegating its power over those agreements
that affect mainly a single Member State to national competition authorities, at the
moment there is little incentive for national authorities to perform the Commission tasks.
These authorities do not have power to grant exemptions and, as mentioned, they lose
their competence if the Commission opens proceedings. 156
Having noted this situation, the Commission has been prompted to study new forms of
co-operation with the administration of Member States. Among the suggestions of some
Member States, the ‘consensus procedure’ has been proposed as a way of agreement
between the Commission and national authorities: as soon as the procedure is initiated by
the opening of the file, the Commission and the authorities should reach agreement as to
whether the case should be investigated and adjudicated by the Commission or by a
national competition authority. 157
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The Commission has raised a different proposal. It suggested a consultation network to
fill in the gaps on information exchange between this Community institution and Member
States. By establishing machinery that enables both parties to consult each other and
deciding which authority will follow the procedure, whenever conflicts of jurisdiction are
liable to arise in dealing with certain Article 81 cases, the uniformity of Community law
application is safe. The proposal of this ‘who goes first’ procedure has been widely
accepted, but not yet implemented. 158
3. National Courts’ role in competition law enforcement
The powers of the Commission differ from those national courts in their objective
and content, but also in the ways in which they are exercised: the Commission exercises
its powers pursuant to the procedural rules laid down by Regulation 17, while national
courts follow national procedural law. 159 The Commission has tried to establish
parameters for the national courts on the application of Community competition rules, but
above all, it has been the case law of the ECJ that has determined the principles
conducive to the avoidance of conflicting decisions.
Although the application of Article 81(3) is not open to national courts, they are
empowered to apply Articles 81(1), 81(2) and 82 of the EC Treaty, by virtue of the direct
applicability of those provisions. 160 Furthermore, national courts are also able to apply the
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decisions and regulations adopted by the Commission related to authorization of
restrictive agreements. 161
Hence, the extent to which national courts make use of Articles 81 and 82 varies from
Member State to Member State. Agreements that infringe the competition rules are
prohibited, and the highest courts in several large Member States have held that damages
lie for infringing Articles 81 and 82.
The first and decisive action of national courts on competition law enforcement is the
analysis of the nullity of an agreement. It is a given that national courts must enforce
lawful agreements, but the EC Treaty provides, in Article 81(2), that any agreement that
infringes Article 81(1) is automatically void. Thus, the nullity and, therefore, the
inapplicability of agreements is a matter primarily for the national courts, which are
under an obligation to apply a sanction. 162 Provisions in contracts that infringe Article 81
are void pro tanto and national courts should not enforce them. It is not easy, though, to
determine whether a provision infringes Article 81 or may be enforced. Sometimes
national courts will have to adjourn to enable the Commission to decide whether to
exempt the agreement. 163
Among the different tasks that national courts perform in EC competition law system, the
capability to recognize their jurisdiction and the cooperation with the Commission are the
most relevant on any procedure. As I mentioned, the first problem facing national courts
is whether the agreements or practices at issue are in breach of the prohibitions laid down
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in articles 81(1) and 82. The courses of action available to national courts to determine
this situation are various and complex. 164
First, national courts must be able to ascertain that neither the Commission nor the
national competition authorities have taken a decision or a less formal measure
concerning the contested agreement or practice. Since any formal decision brings an end
to procedures, national courts are bound by them and must observe them. An exception to
this issue is the ending of a procedure by a comfort letter or any other informal decision:
they are not binding but must be taken into account. 165
A different situation arises if the Commission has not expressed a view on the actual
agreement of practice. In this case, national courts may refer to the case law of the ECJ
and decisions and general notices of the Commission, in order to establish whether the
Court or the Commission has already dealt with similar agreements or practices. If these
principles are insufficient, the courts may either request assistance from the Commission
and stay proceedings to await the decision of the Commission, or decide to defer
judgment where the Commission has initiated a procedure in the case before them or in a
similar case. 166
Last, national courts may stay the proceedings and refer a question to the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty. This consultation process is recognized
by the Commission as the best way to clarify the criteria for the application of
competition rules, due to their complexity and inadequacy. The importance of this
principle is paramount because once the courts have established whether a restrictive
agreement infringes Article 81(1), they must also decide if the agreements may qualify
164
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for an exemption under Article 81(3). Only then can they determine that the contested
agreements are contrary to Community competition law and adopt the appropriate
measures. 167
B. Procedures, decisions, and uniformity of EC Law
As described above, the existing difference among the bodies interacting on the
application of EC competition law makes the importance of Commission evident. Its
tasks and efforts aim towards the consistency and coherence of the EC competition
system. This action is sometimes jeopardized, but the support of the ECJ preserves the
integrity on the European system. However, the procedures that make possible the
continuity of the community antitrust rules are complex and dependant, in certain
situations, of national policies. This is the situation that the Commission tries to avoid at
any cost, without interfering with national standards or particular interests of Member
States.
The main provision on competition law procedure, which establishes the basic procedures
for the Commission’s actions, is Regulation 17. 168 However, since the Commission,
national authorities, and national courts are part of different procedures in their own
jurisdiction, I will only mention those procedures that allow the Commission to preserve
the integrity of the Community competition system. Notwithstanding that, it is important
to mention that the analysis of suspected infringement of EC competition rules may start
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by the Commission’s own initiative, on application by a Member State, 169 or by
applications made by ‘natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest’. 170
1. Scope of Commission’s exclusive authority
The importance of the knowledge of procedures in EC competition law is
paramount for individuals, undertakings, and foreigners to the European system. The
capability of the Commission to determine different actions, adopt decisions, issue
recommendations, grant exemptions, or adopt interim measures, has resulted in a large
amount of doctrine and case law. Even if the parties try to avoid some of these
procedures before the Commission, in order to continue their illegal activity, or to hide
their results in order to avoid any investigation, the Commission has enough resources to
initiate and culminate important procedures to preserve Community trade balance.
The Commission is not an impartial or neutral civil authority in proceedings inter partes,
adopting its decision in favor or what it considers to be the more legitimate of two
opposing positions put to it. Its conduct of proceedings is governed by the principle audi
alteram partem and by the aim of establishing the objective truth by means of an
inquisitorial procedure. 171
The proceedings to analyze possible infringements are laid down by Regulation 17. This
provision establishes two successive but clearly separated procedures. The first one is a
preparatory investigation procedure, whose purpose is to enable the Commission to
obtain the information necessary to check the actual existence and scope of a specific
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factual and real situation, and which includes the possibility of requesting information
and carrying out inspections at the premises of the undertakings. 172
On a second procedure, the Commission and the interested parties are involved in a
statement of the objections to the competition practice of the undertaking. The
Commission sends this statement to the undertakings when it has sufficient evidence of
an infringement. 173 In this procedure, the undertakings have an opportunity to submit
written and oral observations on the objections made against them. This procedure, which
culminates with the adoption of a decision by the Commission, only after being aware of
the views of the parties, can be known as ‘procedure for the adoption of a decision’. 174
In broad terms, the Commission can be involved in different types of procedures. They
depend of certain factors: the form in which an investigation is initiated (infringement
procedures and recommendations); the interests of the undertaking (procedures for
negative clearance and individual exemptions); the cooperation of the latter or the
needings of the Commission to continue its activities (voluntary adjustments or
procedures concluded without a formal decision), and necessary measures for the
Commission’s activities (adoption of interim measures on an urgent basis). 175
Finally, the culmination of the procedure is a decision issued by the Commission.
Various types of decisions can be adopted which are binding in all respects on their
addressees. 176 Among the numerous characteristics of the Commission’s decisions are:
their importance as result of application of Community competition rules in a specific
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manner to specific cases; the possibility of being considered as precedent for the future,
due to the relevance of the case for community purposes; their necessity of stating the
reasons on which they are based and the clearly and unequivocal reasoning followed for
their adoption; and the possibility of being contested before the ECJ under Article 230
EC Treaty. 177
Thus, the decisions of the Commission can be classified as formal and non-formal
decisions. The formal decisions are divided into substantive decisions (whose legislative
basis are Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty) and procedural decisions which are based
on the procedural regulations and help to the adoption of substantive decisions.
On their side, non-formal decisions are not a single document, but a series of
administrative letters178 used by the Commission to indicate the undertakings the
Commission’s preliminary views about certain conduct, or to persuade the former to
adjust their possible conduct to avoid a breach of competition rules. These letters form
part of a series of informal contacts between the Commission and the undertakings, and
do not bind the Commission or confer to the undertakings the right to be heard under
article 19(1) of Regulation 17.
These non-formal decisions are divided as follows: letters closing the file (they inform
undertakings that their cases are to be closed), discomfort letters (after receiving a
notification, the Commission considers that the case is of insufficient significance to deal
with by a decision, but the agreements examined nevertheless contain manifestly
restrictive clauses which it is desirable to remove) and comfort letters (being the most
177
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frequently used, they are the equivalent to an informal negative clearance or individual
exemption, but without the legal certainty given by a formal decision). 179
2. Rights of parties in competition law procedures
The relevance of national courts in competition law enforcement goes beyond
declaring the nullity in certain agreements. Since the prohibitions laid down by Articles
81(1) and 82 are capable of producing direct effects between individuals, those articles
create rights in favor of the persons concerned which the national courts must uphold. 180
An alleged victim of anti-competitive behavior that contravenes either Article 81(1) or
Article 82 may bring an action in the appropriate national court. Nevertheless, the
procedural rules which apply and the remedies that are available vary from one Member
State to another. 181
Furthermore, a complainant is entitled to certain rights: to be kept informed of the
acceptance or rejection of the complaint; to be told of the Commission’s preliminary
findings; to apply to be heard by the Commission (in writing or orally) in the course of
any investigation; and to challenge the final decision of the Commission at the ECJ. 182
Nevertheless, the complainant does not have the same degree of access to the
Commission’s file on the investigations as does the undertaking being investigated; even
more importantly, a complainant cannot force the Commission to investigate a complaint.
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Moreover, private litigants have brought actions against Member States on several
occasions. Sometimes the plaintiff is a national of that State, 183 on other occasions the
plaintiff is a foreign national. 184 All Member States of the EU are under an enforceable
obligation to abide by the EC Treaty and implement such measures, as they are required
to, as part of their national laws. Failure to act on the part of the Member State may result
in liability; similarly, acting in contradiction of EC law may result in liability. 185
3. Remedies on competition procedures
Remedies offer to the parties the possibility to reduce harm caused to them either
by wrongful action of an accused entity, or by misapplication of EC competition rules. 186
These remedies have their basis on actions for non-contractual liability in national courts,
since infringements violate conducts prohibited by Community law, which is directly
applicable in Member States.
During the 1990’s, the ECJ held that national courts must provide adequate remedies for
breach of Community law, although most of the cases have been against governments.
The ECJ has frequently made reference to the obligation of the national courts to protect
rights conferred under Community law, an obligation which derives from Article 10 EC
Treaty. 187 It is for national law to establish procedural rules such as which court has
jurisdiction, but the remedy must be efficacious and no worse than that available for
infringement of national law. 188 The common remedies used in courts by the parties are
damages, injunctions and declarations.
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Damages are often a remedy desired by the parties. It is beyond doubt that they should be
available to compensate those harmed by and infringement of the EC competition rules.
The ECJ has recognized in cases such as Brasserie du Pêcheur v. Germany the right of
individuals to recover damages against other individuals (and not just Member States) for
breaches of Community Law. 189 Also, the Commission has set out its view about the right
of the parties to recover compensation for the “damage suffered as result of
infringements, where such remedies are available in proceedings relating to similar
national law”. 190
An injunction is a remedy that can be granted after a deep analysis of the infringement.
Sometimes, an injunction is granted instead of damages, if these are not an adequate
remedy for the plaintiff; 191 to this end, the plaintiff must quantify the damages it has
suffered. On the other hand if the applicant for injunction fails to demonstrate a serious
question to be tried, no interlocutory injunction will be granted. Moreover, if the evidence
on the trial is outside the jurisdiction of the national court being asked to grant relief,
there may be no jurisdiction over the defendant. 192 The ECJ also held that the
enforcement of a Parliamentary Act could be suspended by means of an interlocutory
injunction notwithstanding a long-settled rule that prohibited such relief. 193
Finally, a declaration is perhaps the most used remedy, when the party relying upon EC
competition law is a party to a contract and wishes that contract to continue,
notwithstanding that one or more clauses in the contract are void for infringement of
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Article 81(1) or 82. However, an application for severance will normally accompany a
declaration in such circumstances. 194
C. Relationship between U.S. federal offices and state institutions
The analysis of the interaction among the different U.S. antitrust enforcement
actors will give a different perspective from that of the European Union. The operation of
antitrust policy reflects pretty well the balance of opinion among the different sectors in
the U.S. The antitrust policy stems from two basic propositions: first, that private,
unaccountable persons should not wield significant amounts of economic power; second,
that should they seek to do so, they should be monitored by a rule of law. 195
As mentioned before, the American antitrust laws can be enforced in different ways: by
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, which may bring civil or criminal
cases against corporations or individuals before federal courts; by the Attorney Generals
enforcing state (and, in certain circumstances, federal) antitrust laws; and by private
parties, entitled to sue in federal court for an injunction and for treble damages if they
believe they have been harmed by a violation of the antitrust laws. 196
The U.S. antitrust bodies play an important role in the procedural efficiency of this
system. The effectiveness of this framework grants legal certainty to the parties,
measured by the large participation of private individuals in different procedures, and the
government participation through follow-on actions. However, an important difference
between the U.S. antitrust system and Community rules is that decentralization in the
latter involves only administrative decisions, made by the national competition

194

Supra Inns of Court, note 33, p. 132.
Supra Neale and Goyder, note 45, p. 470.
196
Pierre-Emmanuel Noel Efficiency Considerations in the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under
European and U.S. Antitrust Law, Eur. Competition L. Rev. 1997, 18(8), 498-519, p. 498.
195

46
authorities, with small involvement of courts in the process. Broadly speaking, the U.S.
antitrust system also encourages and assists private plaintiffs, through public
enforcement. 197
Hence, the desired end in both the EU and in the U.S. is maximizing the use of
enforcement resources and obtaining consistent results in the enforcement of similar
laws. Each has taken different approaches towards the coordination of the efforts of their
central and state authorities. In the U.S., coordination is the result of efforts by both the
federal agencies and the states. Furthermore, coordination is currently recognized as
promoting efficient use of scarce antitrust law enforcement resources and improving
consistency in the application of the federal and various state antitrust laws to the benefit
of the business community. 198 These efforts have taken many forms that will be discussed
throughout this section.
1. Cooperation within U.S. antitrust enforcement
Antitrust enforcement has crossed different periods in U.S. legal history. The shift
from a passive enforcement attitude of federal officers, concentrated merely on
promoting fair competition, to a vigorous and enthusiastic antitrust enforcement is a
relative newcomer to the judicial battleground. 199
On several occasions, in recent years where both federal and state enforcers have had an
interest, they have initiated joint investigations and actions. Also, cooperation efforts
have involved cross-deputization, through which federal or state enforcement officials are
authorized to act in the other’s enforcement jurisdiction as its agent. 200 Federal officials
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benefit from state officials’ deep knowledge of their local communities to detect
violations, for it would be virtually impossible for federal agencies to monitor
compliance of firms with the antitrust laws in a country as large as the United States.
Furthermore, efforts have been made to increase information sharing between federal and
state agencies in areas such as merger enforcement. The issuing of the Information
Sharing Protocol, 201 developed by the NAAG’s Executive Working Group, in 1992, is
proof of consistency between the two enforcement levels, allowing antitrust enforcers to
coordinate and share communication at the earliest stages of an investigation.
2. The “State action” doctrine in U.S. antitrust enforcement and the Supremacy Clause
The “State Action” doctrine 202 exempts qualifying state and local government
regulation from federal antitrust enforcement, even if the regulation at issue compels an
otherwise clear violation of the federal antitrust laws. Due to the doctrine of preemption,
the federal antitrust structure stands in a strong position in front of state law. However, no
serious argument has been made in favor of Congress’ intention to use the Sherman Act
to displace all forms of state and local regulation related to competition. 203 This doctrine
has an exemption that stands for the proposition that federal antitrust should not be used
to intrude too deeply into state regulatory process. 204
Thus, in the absence of federal preemption, action by a state, through legislation or
regulation, is immune, irrespective of the anticompetitive effect. The state may, in short,
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replace the federal scheme with its own judgment. 205 This matter has been a recurrent
subject of litigation; courts have been asked to decide the degree of state involvement
needed to immunize an anticompetitive practice. 206
The Supreme Court implied in Goldfarb that antitrust conduct is only immunized when
the state, through its sovereign power, requires the practice under question and actually
supervises it. 207 Thus, not every act of the state or its subdivisions automatically comes
within the immunity of state action.
In a subsequent decision, the Ninth Circuit set out three conditions under which the
immunity established in Parker is to be applied. 208 The first condition provides that,
where the circumstances point to a state policy to replace competition with regulation in a
certain industry or activity, the entity claiming immunity only needs to show that it is
authorized by the state to ‘do business’, since the decrease in competition is foreseeable
result in those cases. As a second condition, the Ninth Court mentions that, where there
are “abundant indications that a state’s policy is to support competition, a subordinate
state entity must do more than merely produce an authorization to ‘do business’ to show
that the state’s policy is to displace competition”. 209 The third condition will exist where
the state has a general policy to increase competition yet allows for a specific
anticompetitive activity. 210
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An undeniable problem that courts have faced, is that has been necessary to decide about
the conflicts between federal antitrust and state regulation. A variety of approaches to this
issue have been proposed. One approach is an efficiency test (efficient, or competitive
state or local regulation should be permitted, but harmful regulation should be found
inconsistent with federal antitrust policy). A second approach is jurisdictional (if the state
regulates a purely intrastate market, its regulation is exempted from antitrust scrutiny, but
if the market has substantial interstate spillovers, then federal antitrust scrutiny is
appropriate). A third approach would be to conceive of the federal antitrust laws as
means of combating regulatory “capture” at the state or local level (instead of creating
regulatory programs at the behest of producers or small producers, which prevent new
entries in their market, an anticapture system would use federal antitrust laws to
distinguish between pro-consumer and captured regulatory regimes). A fourth approach
would consider whether the relevant decision maker is financially interested in the
outcome of a regulatory decision (the ‘active supervision’ prong of the ‘state action’ test
is reflected in this intent). 211
D. Procedures in U.S. Antitrust Law
The initiation of procedures in U.S. antitrust law is dependant on the provision
pursuing the enforcement of competition rules. As I mentioned, the main laws that
encompass antitrust rules are the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act, and
each one establishes their own jurisdictional requirements.
Thus, under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the restraint of trade must be shown to have
occurred in “trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”.
211
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Where the restraint does not occur in the flow of interstate commerce there must be a
showing of a substantial effect on interstate or foreign commerce. 212
Under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the activity challenged must be conducted by a
person engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and must occur in the course of
interstate of foreign commerce. Moreover, Section 3 applies only to sales or leases of
goods or commodities and it has no application to export sales. 213
The FTC Act contains no such limitations: provided the activity challenged occurs in or
affects commerce, jurisdiction will arise. There is no requirement to demonstrate that the
effect is substantial. Neither is there any limitation to a particular kind of transaction
(such as sales or leases) nor to particular subjects of the transaction (goods or
commodities). The Commission is “empowered and directed” under Section 5(a)(2) of
the Act to prevent individuals or corporations from engaging in the activities prescribed
in Section 5(a)(1) and is for that purpose empowered to hold hearings. No provision is
made for private suits to be brought under the Act. 214
In choosing cases to prosecute, each agency has the power to investigate by compelling
the production of documents or testimony. The investigative phase will reveal with
substantial precision the context, and therefore the competitive significance, of the
conduct at issue. In deciding whether to prosecute, the agency will often have the benefit
of explanations or arguments presented by the party whose conduct may be challenged.
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The meetings in which these explanations take place are highly appreciated by lawyers
and counselors, proving to be extremely fruitful in avoiding any civil prosecution. 215
An important feature of one of the federal agencies, the Antitrust Division, is its
capability to opt for a criminal prosecution under Sherman Act violations. The Division
frequently does so with respect to those violations identified as per se unlawful. In
addition, the division uses other criminal statutes —including those dealing with wire and
mail fraud, false claims, perjury, and obstruction of justice— in its antitrust enforcement
efforts. Furthermore, the Division will seek to impanel a grand jury to investigate
information indicating the existence of criminal violations. If criminal prosecution is
pursued, the Federal Bureau of Investigation or special investigators may be employed,
with their expert methods of criminal detection, investigation, and surveillance. If
indictments are eventually sought, an arrest may follow. 216
For its part, the FTC brings its cases before an administrative law judge, with procedures
quite similar to federal court litigation, or in certain circumstances, directly in federal
court. Both kinds of FTC cases may ultimately be appealed to a federal appellate court. 217
When, as a result of complaints or after investigation, it is believed that some breach of
Section 5 of the FTC Act or of the sections of the Clayton Act under the Commission’s
jurisdiction, has occurred, the Commission may issue a formal complaint. Under Section
5 of the FTC Act, the Commission must have reason to believe not only that some unfair
method of competition is being used but also that “a proceeding by it in respect thereto
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would be to the interest of the public”, meaning that it has a statutory limitation not to
proceed against every known offence. 218

1. Private actions as the primary force to initiating antitrust procedures
The third major enforcement ‘agency’ (after the Antitrust Division and the FTC)
is the private plaintiff who brings actions in the U.S. District Courts. The number of
private enforcement actions pending has fluctuated greatly, from about 1400 in the late
1970’s to about 750 in the mid to late 1980’s, but private actions continue to represent at
least 90 per cent of all Federal antitrust cases. 219
Private civil enforcement can be commenced by “any person who [is] injured in his
business or property”220 by reason of a violation of “anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws”. The action can be either for treble damages 221 or injunctive relief. 222 Reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs are permitted under either a damage award or injunctive relief.
According to the Clayton Act, Section 4, a plaintiff must be a ‘person’, which includes
natural persons, corporations, and unincorporated associations recognized by federal,
state, or foreign law. Municipalities, states, and foreign governments are all permissible
plaintiffs. Above all, section 4 is designed to redress market injuries that occur to market
participants when the market becomes less competitive. Further, the claim of injury must

218

Supra Neale and Goyder, note 45, p. 385.
Clifford A. Jones Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA, Oxford University
Press, Great Britain, 1999, pp. 16 and chapters 7, 14, 17.
220
15 U.S.C. §§ 15c, 15h.
221
Idem.
222
15 U.S.C. § 26.
219

53
not be so tenuous that damages will be extremely difficult to prove, or that it will simply
be “duplicative” of the injury suffered by others. 223
As mentioned, treble-damages are a powerful and growing factor in the effectiveness of
antitrust enforcement. 224 These actions, under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, must be
brought in the federal courts and are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
An action is to be served on the defendant company in one of the district courts, and as
the trade of sizeable companies extends over a wide area, a plaintiff will often have a
wide choice of courts in which bring the action. 225
Once the case has been filed, it is assigned to an individual district court judge, and he or
she remains responsible for all procedural hearings arising in the course of the case, as
well as for its ultimate trial and decision. After the substantive trial it is open to either
party, if dissatisfied with the outcome, to appeal to the relevant Circuit Court of
Appeals. 226
2. Remedies available for the parties on antitrust procedures
A comparative analysis of U.S. antitrust law must stress the results of the
procedures in this framework for those who break it. The Government’s choice between
criminal and civil proceedings cannot be guided simply by the gravity of supposed
offences and is to some extent artificial. More than criminal proceedings based on
Sherman Act violations, U.S. Government seeks to enforce antitrust compliance through
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high fines. Criminal enforcement is rarely sought, limited in practice to outrageous and
clearly illegal conduct. 227
On the other hand, remedies for civil violations can include injunctions, as well as
dissolutions or divestiture for illegal mergers or occasionally monopolization. As any
private plaintiff, the U.S. Government is entitled to recover treble damages for injuries it
suffers as result of an antitrust violation. 228
The FTC, being an regulatory agency which is more specialized than courts and not as
bound by strict rules of procedure and evidence, counts on a “cease and desist” order as
its general remedy; this may amount to forced dissolution or divestiture in the case of a
merger. Furthermore, findings of violations of the FTC Act that are not also antitrust
violations will not support subsequent private actions for treble damages.
Since state antitrust laws often parallel the federal acts and rely on their interpretation, the
activity of State Attorneys General is based on these federal guidelines. These public
employees were granted the right in 1976 to sue in their sovereign capacity as “parens
patriae” for treble damages for injuries to their general economy under the antitrust
laws. 229 In federal courts a state will sue to collect damages that it suffered in its capacity
as the direct purchaser of the product at issue.
However, is important to stress that the approach followed in U.S. courts begins with the
premise that plaintiffs are required to establish the fact of their injury by reason of the
defendant’s antitrust violation ant then to establish the amount of the damages
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sustained. 230 In broad terms, the types of damages which are recoverable in a U.S.
antitrust action will vary greatly according to the precise conduct in the case, the nature
of the business or industry concerned, and the nature of the violation.
Nonetheless, except for price discrimination claims, there are three varieties of damages.
The first type, overcharge damages, search for recovering when the plaintiff may have
paid too much or been paid to little for a product due to actions of the seller which
violates antitrust laws; the second type, amount past lost profits, is recoverable when a
plaintiff’s business was damaged or incurred loses due to conduct violating the antitrust
laws; thirdly, when the defendant’s unlawful conduct may have destroyed the plaintiff’s
business or otherwise impaired its future earnings capacity (in such cases, the plaintiff
may recover the future loss of anticipated profits or the present loss of going concern
value, but not both). 231
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CHAPTER 3
MODERNIZATION OF EC LAW AS RESPONSE TO NEEDS IN TRADE
A. Elements that led to proposals for modernization: why the need for change?
The evolution on trade and commercial exchange in Europe, and particularly, in
its western countries, has led to the development of competition rules. Reform and
decentralization of enforcement of competition law in the Community232 have in recent
years become the central plan of the academic and political debate in EC antitrust law. 233
It is a well-known fact that the Commission as the central body enforcing the EC rules on
competition has for a long time been unable to cope with the increasing workload. 234
Some of the most important scholars have pointed out as unsatisfactory the present
system of implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. 235
Nowadays, the major shortcomings of the current system are its inefficiency and the
insufficient involvement of national authorities and courts in the enforcement of the
European Community236 . Both aspects have a negative impact on the effective protection
of competition in the EC. The Commission’s exemption monopoly blocks the appropriate
participation of national authorities and national courts in the enforcement of EC
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competition rules. So far, authorities and courts have improved in last decades, and it is
possible now to have more EC competition cases decided by national bodies. 237
However, is important to understand that the principal motivation behind the reform
project of the Commission (i.e. the White Paper on modernization of EC competition
law) is not the workload as such that the notification system creates for the EC main
competition body. It is rather the fact that a substantial part of the Commission’s
resources is tied up in a notification procedure that does not essentially contribute to the
protection of competition238 : it is now imperative to observe efficiency considerations for
reform. 239
A further issue must be considered: the very elaborated procedures of Regulation 17 —
especially the appropriate investigative measures, the need for every formal decisions to
be announced in advance in all official languages in the Official Journals, and the
consultation of the Advisory Committee on the draft decision— seem appropriate only to
large important cases which do not need to be decided quickly. 240
1. Regulation 17/62 implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
The wording of competition rules in the EC Treaty is vague on its first reading.
This situation left the door open for imprecision and considerable discretion on the
enforcement of Articles 81 and 82. 241 Therefore, in 1962, the Commission obtained
various powers from the Council —through Regulation 17— to enforce the competition
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rules and also to have exclusive competence to grant exemptions. 242 The procedure under
Regulation 17 is complex; it was hoped that the centralization established by it would
lead to uniform interpretation and application, despite the various national attitudes.
Commission proceedings may start in different ways: a complaint filed by a person
entitled with a sufficient interest 243 , by the Commission’s own initiative 244 , a
parliamentary question, or from notifications. 245 Moreover, based on articles 11 to 14 of
Regulation 17, the Commission is entitled to obtain information concerning parties to an
agreement in different ways 246 . However, the Commission finds much of the information
it requires in its files of notifications (those coming from A/B type notifications, as
established in Regulation 3385/94), which sometimes contain vast information about the
structure of the market. Finally, under article 19, the parties are given an opportunity of
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presenting their view before the Commission makes a decision on the merits: one that
clears, prohibits or exempts an agreement or imposes fines. 247
In Section 2 of this chapter I will deal with the major issues that EC competition law has
dealt with lately. Moreover, a review of the most important proposals for reform of this
framework will be made, as an attempt to stress on the necessity and importance of this
change. Furthermore, I will mention some of the criticisms made of this proposal by
important authors.
2. Secondary legislation in other sectors
It is important to mention that the Commission early on noticed that the provision
of Article 81(3), which granted exemption to certain undertakings, was limited in its
scope. In order to broaden the spectrum of different fields of industry that directly
affected competition law in the common market, the Commission issued different block
exemptions. These rules were created due to the Commission’s expertise to standardize
its review process and to set forth general standards for the exemption of certain types of
agreements that were unlikely to restrict competition within the Community. 248 This
analysis will not deal with the reforms on specific sectors, but rather mention the most
important provisions of some sectors.
These block exemptions were highly appreciated by the enterprises, due to the
opportunity offered to create an exemption under Article 81(3) for entire categories of
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agreements and to exempt such agreements from notification and individualized
review. 249 The principal block exemptions cover agreements related to:
a) exclusive distribution; 250
b) exclusive purchasing; 251
c) patent licensing; 252
d) know-how licensing; 253
e) franchising; 254
f) specialization; and 255
g) research and development. 256
Furthermore, the Council and the Commission noted the necessity to regulate certain
sectors in specific ways, due to economic or political importance of these areas. Certain
regulations and directives had to be established in order to expand the control of EC
Competition policy, excluding, at the same time, the application of Regulation 17 on
some of these sectors. Thus, fields such as provision of transport of services 257 (land, 258
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sea,259 and air 260 ), banking and insurance, 261 and communications 262 were considered as
important competition fields that needed to be specifically regulated.
In 1990, the Merger Regulation was enacted to cover mergers falling outside the reach of
Articles 81 and 82 as the “only instrument” applicable to concentrations at the
Community-wide-level. Under the Merger Regulation, the Commission is given the
power to prevent the creation of any concentration of undertakings that either creates or
empowers a dominant position in the EU. 263
The Council and the Commission have noticed that certain sectors, such as those
mentioned before, must be carefully analyzed, but not prevented from their proper
development. The use of economical analysis has proved to be effective and necessary,
before applying competition rules in certain areas. A result of this criterion is that the
Commission proposed and issued a Regulation on Vertical Agreements 264 that, virtually,
constitutes broad single legislation for vertical distribution agreements. Its purpose is to
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provide a more economic approach by imposing ceilings of market share at various
levels, instead of separate parameters on market distributions. This provision will not
eliminate individual exemptions, but rather use a less formalistic approach towards
agreements in certain areas and reduce the burden of notification and monitoring such
agreements.
3. How U.S. Antitrust Law has faced procedural issues
Nowadays, the EC competition law framework has demonstrated a clear purpose
to evolve according to economic parameters. However, the notions concerning market
importance have been present in US Antitrust law structure for a long time. The concept
of efficiency has determined the drafting and, later on, approval of important U.S.
antitrust provisions. Besides, the institutional structure, as we mentioned before, has
played an extremely important role in the evolution of different procedures of this area of
law in that country.
The political issues in U.S. antitrust law have not determined largely the structure of this
framework, as happened in the European system. The most important feature in the
American system is the role that federal courts play in the establishment of key decisions,
cases, which results in a dynamic and almost case-by case evolution of antitrust law.
Furthermore, the importance of individual suits in U.S. courts has proved to be a relevant
characteristic of this system: the increased individual awareness of the existence, impact,
and effectiveness of antitrust rules enhances the development of decentralized
enforcement in the US. In essence, a significant difference between the U.S. and the EC
is that the decentralization envisioned by the latter involves only administrative decision
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making by the Members National Competition Authorities, with no substantive
involvement of courts in the process, while the former involves an active participation of
federal and, sometimes, state courts. 265
The use of strict economic criteria in U.S. courts resulted in clear and radical differences
with EC competition system. While U.S. basic laws such as the Sherman Act establish
unconditional prohibitions of all contracts and conspiracies in restraint of trade —
including the so-called “rule of reason”266 — the prohibition of restrictive agreements in
Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty is expressly made inapplicable in 81(3) to agreements
which promote economic progress, subject to further conditions about undue effects on
competition. 267 A result of this difference is that the enforcement process is affected,
because no agreements can be characterized in a strict sense illegal per se in the European
framework. 268
In broad terms, two advantages of the U.S. antitrust model can be found in comparison
with its EC counterpart: first, with its exceptionless prohibitions of restrictive
arrangements, this system ensures that the law will be enforced by lawyers advising
businesses, and the bulk of the enforcement problem is overcome in this way; second,
clear and easily understood prohibitions are fair to the business community, who knows
where the law stands and what are the limits which must not be overstepped. 269
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B. Analysis of the 1999 White Paper on modernisation of rules implementing articles 81
and 82
The White Paper 270 recalls the historic circumstances in which the EC regime of
control of undertakings, organized by Regulation 17, was conceived. It manifests the
problems that the architects of the EC competition law system faced at the moment of
deciding between an authorization regime and a legal exception regime. 271 In the end, the
EC opted for the authorization system, in which the Commission was competent to
declare non-applicable the dispositions of Article 81(3) to an undertaking, under the
condition of being previously notified to Commission. 272 The choice for this system is
explained by the Commission as lack of enough market knowledge, undertakings nature,
other restrictive practices by competent authorities, and also, by the relative inexperience
of national jurisdictions on European competition law. 273
The movement for modernization of EC competition rules, initiated by the Commission,
has three fundamental objectives: (1) to reduce the Commission’s workload, (2) to
increase legal certainty for business, and (3) to maintain consistency in the application of
EC competition rules. 274
1. Options for modernization
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In the White Paper, the Commission established five proposals for reform. The
fifth one is the proposal selected by the Commission as its alternative, which consists of
making Article 81(3) directly applicable without the need for exemption (either
individual or under a block exemption regulation) and decentralizing to national
competition authorities the power to investigate complaints. 275 The other four options are
not examined in detail in the White Paper and the impression is that the options have
been put forward for completeness. 276 Nevertheless, is important to briefly mention its
contents, to obtain a wider perspective of the Commission’s purposes.
The initial four proposals are: (1) introduction of a “Rule of Reason” to modify the
interpretation of Article 81 277 , (2) decentralization of the current system of application of
Article 81(3) 278 , (3) broadening of the scope of article 4(2) of Regulation 17/62 279 , and
(4) procedural simplifications. 280
a. “Rule of Reason”
The first option would decrease the number of cases brought before the
Commission, in need of an evaluation of the conditions laid down in 81(3) of the EC
Treaty. Thus, decrease the number of cases overall as a full competitive balance would be
already made in the contest of Article 81(1) EC. However, the Commission rejected this
option, because a restriction of Article 81 could only be achieved by a Treaty
amendment. 281
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b. Article 81(3) decentralization
The second option —granting national competition authorities the power to apply
Article 81(3) and to adopt constitutive exemption decisions— would function on the
allocation of cases between authorities under a “center of gravity test”. 282 This option was
rejected on the basis that it would not itself reduce the total number of notifications, but
merely redistribute the cases between the Commission and the national competition
authorities. 283
c. Broadening article 4(2) of Regulation 17/62
As the third option, the White Paper discusses a widening option of the scope of
article 4(2) of Regulation 17, the provision that, with article 6, allows an exemption
decision under Article 81(3) to take effect from a date earlier than the date of notification
in certain cases. 284 Through this option, even in the event of late notifications, the
Commission could adopt an exemption decision that would still be effective ex post.
However, this option was rejected, because the Commission wanted to maintain its
monopoly to grant exemptions. 285 Thus, the system will remain unchanged.
d. Procedural simplifications

282

“The Member State where the anticompetitive effects of the agreement would be felt most strongly
would have competence to grant or to refuse to grant an exemption, whilst the Commission would retain
competence for cases involving new legal issues or which affected more than one Member State and also
those cases involving public undertakings under article 86[…]”. Supra Holmes, note 275, at p. 55. This
option has been promoted by the German National Competition Authority (Bundeskartellamt).
283
Supra White Paper, note 270, at para. 60.
284
Supra Holmes, note 275, at p. 56.
285
Supra White Paper, note 270, at para. 65.

67
The fourth option was the least attractive of all, at least if considered alone, and
not in combination with other reforms. 286 Although simplification of procedure rules,
such as abolishing the requirement for translation decisions into all Community
languages, simplifying Advisory Committee procedures, etc., may result in a more
efficient use of the Commission’s resources, the problem of centralization remains
unsolved. 287
2. The option selected by the Commission
The option prefered by the Commission in the White Paper proposal can be
explained in the following terms: Article 81(3) would become directly applicable 288
across the European Union and the notification system will be abolished, thus moving
from an administrative exemption system to a “legal exception” system. 289 This means
that an agreement will not breach Article 81 taken as a whole if the criteria contained in
Article 81(3) are satisfied. 290
Under this system with no prima facie invalidity, no prior authorization is needed if the
undertakings concerned believe their practices fulfilled the criteria of exception, and no
notification is necessary either. 291 This reform would allow national competition
authorities and national courts, to apply Article 81 as a whole, besides the
Commission. 292 However, the ECJ and the CFI will provide guidance for national
authorities and national courts, through decisions on whether an agreement falls within
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Article 81. The same guidance will be provided through formal decisions of the
Commission, block exemptions and other policy documents issued by the Commission. 293

a. Advantages
This proposal has two main elements that must be positively considered: only
national courts would have jurisdiction to apply Article 81(3) by declaring that an
agreement satisfied the tests in that article and was exempted from the prohibition; and
investigations of alleged cartels and anticompetitive agreements would as far as possible
be decentralized to the national competition authorities. 294
Furthermore, these points can also be seen as particular advantages, in addition to make
more effective use of the Commission’s resources: the rule of primacy of Community law
over national law would be strengthened as a result of the direct application of Article
81(3), and the enforceability of agreements would be improved as defendants would be
able to rely on the direct applicability of Article 81(3) and therefore artificial claims of
infringement of the Treaty would be reduced. 295
b. New roles of the Commission, national authorities, and national courts
The most important matters will be the new roles that the Commission, national
competition authorities, and national courts will play in this directly applicable and selfexecuting system. 296 The Commission hopes to be in a position which enables it to
concentrate on the most important cases, these being cases which involve especially
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serious restrictions of the competitive structure or which raise new issues of law. 297
However, the Commission, in such a new division of responsibilities, remains the sole
body to determine the competition policy at Community level. 298 Apparently, the
Commission is willing to give up its monopoly with regard to Article 81(3) EC Treaty,
but not at the cost of any decrease as to its overall power. 299
On a system with direct applicability of Article 81(3), national competition authorities
will have the full power to enforce the EC competition rules and to assess whether or not
a restrictive practice meets the requirements for exceptions as laid down in the Treaty. 300
However, the concept of “network of authorities”301 has been largely discussed, as means
to ensure communication among national authorities, to ensure consistency in application
of EC law. 302 It is necessary that the national authorities are legally as well as factually
equipped with sufficient means to effectively enforce the competition rules. One should
remember that the situation (national legislation, economic and human resources) of these
authorities is not the same in every EC Member State. 303
Last, but not least, the role of national courts in competition law enforcement will be
decisive. The White Paper envisages and “enhanced role” for the national courts in the
application of the competition rules under the new directly applicable system. 304 An
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important matter will be the necessity to recognize any judgment that has become res
judicata on any court of another Member State, under the Brussels 305 and Lugano 306
Conventions. It has been mentioned that national courts must be trusted to apply EC law
competently in the field of competition, and that confidence will grow as competition
principles and common sense draw together. 307 However, a new approach towards
competition issues, based on economic analysis, will make the application of competition
rules more difficult for national courts, because most of them are not used to this type of
speculative analysis. 308
c. Difficulties with legal certainty and consistency
The proposal to make Article 81(3) directly applicable raises a number of
problems. Two main areas of concern are legal certainty and consistent application of EC
law across the European Union. 309
The concerns for legal certainty center around the perception that abandoning the
notification system, and the guarantees for business that it provides, will result in a loss
of certainty for business, with the economic and legal consequences that will entail. 310
The Commission considers decisions of national competition authorities to be binding
only within their respective Member States, and it would be for each Member State to
decide whether its national competition authority decisions would bind a national
court. 311 In order to avoid this matter, the Commission has proposed that it might take
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non-infringement decisions in cases where it is in the public interest to do so. On the
other side, national competition authorities would not take decisions when either found
that an agreement did not fall within Article 81 or found that the conditions of Article
81(3) were satisfied. 312
Another serious issue related to certainty is the court actions in the Member States, or
‘double jeopardy’. The Commission’s current position is that court decisions in one
Member State will not be recognized in other Member States except when required in
accordance with the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. 313 This means that only a
decision on the same subject matter between the same parties will be recognized in
another Member State.
In terms of national competition authorities, the Commission has proposed developing a
complex net of communication and information exchange 314 as a solution for this matter.
Another proposal is developing a convention under Article 293 EC Treaty, which would
provide that decisions of one national competition authority should be recognized by
national competition authorities (and courts) of other Member States. 315
Finally, forum shopping is another matter that has to be dealt with under the new system
proposed. A party proceeding on the basis of a tortious claim has a choice of jurisdiction
between the courts of his Member State or the courts of the Member State where the
harmful effect occurred. 316
The problem relating to consistency centers on the issue of the coherent application of EC
competition law across the European Union. The concern is that as the application of
312
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Articles 81 and 82 is devolved to national competition authorities and the national courts,
variations in the application of the law will evolve, depending on the approaches taken by
courts or authorities. 317
In order to solve this issue, the Commission has proposed some competition policy
instruments and specific measures to ensure a harmonised development of EC
competition law: it wishes to be involved (as amicus curiae) in court actions brought
under Article 81 in order to ensure consistency of decisions. Also, it proposed the
establishment of a network between the various national authorities and the Commission
itself, which through a constant flow of information will serve to ensure that cases are
properly allocated between members of the network and are decided in a cohesive and
consistent manner. 318 However, it proposed a right referral to the CFI for a binding
decision as the most suitable mechanism for ensuring consistency of court decisions. 319
C. Parallel structures in U.S. Antitrust Law
Unlike the situation in the EU Member States, the antitrust tradition in the U.S. is
well developed, based on common cultural and economic foundations. Thus, even if we
can find similarities between the two competition frameworks, their process of creation
and evolution purport, in most of the cases, similar structures that are not simply a
variation of its counterpart. Overall, this procedure structures answers to different needs,
and new features of the market can finally influence its evolution or modernization.
However, the complexity of the U.S. federal and state system has largely determined the
dynamics of the antitrust system. The existence of useful elements to determine the
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violation or exemption on competition rules, such as per se rule, rule of reason,
guidelines, or intense exchange of information among antitrust enforcers, has proved to
be effective in implementing antitrust laws.
While state antitrust laws may differ in their particular provisions, they share a common
core, which is sufficiently well defined, allowing states to identify and pursue their
interests as a group, even when they are at odds with federal enforcers 320 . The U.S.
system, however, does create the problem of overlapping jurisdiction between federal and
state antitrust law. Inconsistent results are not considered to be threatening, with the
possible exception of mergers, because interpretation of state law often relies on federal
precedent. 321
Thus, variations on decisions have been the motor of U.S. antitrust law evolution, instead
of been considered radical differences that can undermine the framework. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has provided the unity in the American system: it has played a
decisive role on the harmonisation and clarification of federal antitrust law.
Furthermore, some procedural aspects that the EC discussed in its modernization
proposal have already been working in the U.S. system for a long time ago. Elements
such as exemption, decentralization, “rule of reason” application, elimination of certain
procedures, and direct applicability have been a natural step in U.S. antitrust
enforcement. Again, we must not forget the essential differences between U.S. and EC
structures, but it can be affirmed that the modernization of the latter, considering
American procedure elements, was an unavoidable step. I will comment on some of these
procedure elements in the US framework..
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1. The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Rule
Since the inception of the Sherman Act, it has been necessary to determine the
real content of its provisions; the courts have established a line when conflicting
considerations have arisen. This law declares in its Section 1 that “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal”. 322
Thus, a test to prove violation of antitrust laws will be a simple declaration of illegality. If
this would be the case, upon the face meaning of these words, every contract for purchase
or sale, every partnership, every merger, every joint venture arrangement, and the vast
majority of everyday commercial contracts would be unlawful, since they all involve
some restraints of trade. 323 At this point, the courts have made the proper distinctions
drawing the lines by which the generality of the term “restraint of trade” is tamed to an
infinite variety of particular facts.
Also, great importance has been paid to the interpretation of the phrase of the Clayton
Act that forbids any price discrimination whose effect “[m]ay be substantially to lessen
competition […]”. 324 Furthermore, the FTC is vague too when it refers to “[u]nfair
methods of competition […]”. 325 To this end, it has been necessary to establish certain
legal principles and rules of interpretation, which the courts apply to these problems;
these two principles are so-called rule of reason and per se rules.
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The debate to establish clear differences between these two criteria has been large and
prolific, particularly at the judiciary level. Both courts and commentators often say that
most practices analyzed as antitrust violations are considered under a “rule of reason”,
while per se rules apply only to a limited number of them. 326
In first place, the Supreme Court determined that a literal interpretation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act was highly inconvenient. By establishing the rule of reason, the
Supreme Court determined that the meaning of “every” on this part of the law meant
“every unreasonable restraint of trade”. 327 The clearest statement of this rule, though, is
found in the 1918 Supreme Court decision:
“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress of even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, and all relevant factors.
This is not because a good intention will save and otherwise objectionable regulation or
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.”328
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From the rule of reason, which is essentially a rule of construction of elements, the U.S.
antitrust system turned to per se rules, which are rules of evidence. 329 These rules say that
once a certain amount of information is known about a practice, a judgment about its
legality can be passed without further inquiry. However, the difference between a per se
rule and a rule of reason standard lies in how much is needed to know before a decision
can be made. 330 Since the significance of judicial rulings is that certain restrictive
practices are illegal per se is evidentiary, the prosecution has only to prove as a matter of
fact that price fixing has occurred and judgment must follow. 331
Thus, the per se rule can be defined as an empirical rule, whose application is subject to
continual testing. In broad terms, labeling something illegal as per se implies two
concepts: first, the legality of a practice can be determined without inquiring into the
market structure or the market power of those engaged in the practice; second, this
labeling entails that certain justifications or defenses will not be permitted. 332
Last, it is important to notice that the evolution of both illegality tests has been
determined by the particular practices of courts. Thus, the adoption of a per se test for
price-fixing agreements, and its subsequent application to other market-rigging
arrangements, focuses attention on the use of per se rules as an enforcement device. Until
the recent swing away from per se rules, it was not uncommon for antitrust courts to
adopt rules for automatically condemning certain practices after first studying them under
the rule of reason. 333
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2. U.S. antitrust federal system: a developed structure of administrative and legal
principles
Courts play an important role in U.S. antitrust law enforcement. The cases
decided by the different courts allowed this framework to become a set of rules which
balance economical and legal principles. However, the administrative part of this system
became, virtually, the link among the different actors on this legal area.
Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have a variety of roles
in antitrust enforcement and competition policy in addition to prosecuting violations.
Each has an advisory opinion procedure that permits any business to inquire whether a
contemplated activity is acceptable under the antitrust laws. 334
Furthermore, the U.S. system allows private entities to avoid the costs and risks of a trial,
by means of different elements of previous evaluation. Both the Antitrust Division and
the FTC have issued guidelines that give specific directions on how particular
commercial arrangements, such as mergers, licensing of intellectual property, foreign
business conduct, or practices in the health care field, will be analyzed. 335
One of the main procedures that enable private parties to enter into negotiation with these
administrative offices is the consent decree. This operation is the equivalent of a civil
action of pleading nolo contendere. When the Department of Justice has stated a
complaint to the court and asked for equity relief, it is open to the respondent companies
to seek the Department’s agreement to settle the case by means of a decree giving the
Government the relief it considers necessary without going through the expensive process
of trial. When the terms of a consent decree have been agreed, the Department of Justice
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has to fill a ‘statement of competitive impact’, along with the proposed decree, which is
published in the federal register and nominated newspapers. 336
In other situations, the Department is willing in suitable cases to examine a proposed
course of action by a company or industry and has established a formal Business Review
Letter procedure for this purpose. In particular, it will state that it has no present intention
to institute criminal proceedings in respect to the scheme. Besides, the Department for the
guidance of the legal and business communities normally publishes the text of the
Business Review Letter. 337
Similar to the Antitrust Division, the FTC has procedures for settling cases without
litigation. The equivalent to the consent decree is the so-called ‘consent order’ which the
Commission may negotiate. It has the power to negotiate with a party before a complaint
is formally issued against the latter. However, nowadays, the FTC is more inclined to
issue a complaint first and only then enter into talks about a settlement if the respondent
company is willing to do so. 338
On account of this, the Commission has three main ways to give advice to the business
community:339
a) Industry Guides covering both consumer protection and antitrust matters: these
are administrative interpretations of the legal rules and may relate to the practices
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of one industry or to those common to several industries. They are not legally
binding on the Commission;
b) Publication of trade regulation rules: in a more formal practice, the FTC, through
lengthy and full procedures of publication and consultation, publishes rules. The
Commission in complaints against individual defendants, who alleged to have
adopted unfair trading practices, heavily relies on these rules. They can be either
limited to particular industries or have general application. They are similar to the
issue of delegated legislation; and
c) Advisory opinions: These are formal written statements issued on behalf of the
Commission in response to a request for guidance as to the legality of a
prospective course of action; it cannot be used to ask for advice on the legality of
a practice already adopted. The opinions will be binding upon the Commission
provided all relevant factors have been notified to it until or unless it is rescinded.
Even if rescinded, no proceedings will be instituted in respect of actions prior to
that time which relied on the advisory opinion.
Furthermore, like every government agency, the FTC and the Antitrust Division issue
statements and press releases and their leadership finds occasions to give numerous,
frequently revealing speeches to lawyers or to industry groups. In addition to the case law
and the statutes themselves, these sources form part of the antitrust administrative and
legal background that every antitrust lawyer must be aware before advising his or her
client. 340
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CONCLUSIONS
The duality in the analyzed systems as means to enforce antitrust rules is traceable
to vastly different historical roots. The future coexistence of competition enforcers at the
two levels of government in the two systems is likely to develop along different lines.
Despite the pronounced differences between legal systems in the US and the EC, the U.S.
system for the enforcement of federal antitrust law is the paradigm of antitrust
enforcement.
Both systems have developed as the most advanced competition frameworks despite their
complexity. Nevertheless, the significant differences between these two systems render
them unique and yet compatible. The legal certainty in the U.S. system, with nonexception legal criteria to determine violations, provides a strong incentive for its actors
to rely in the effectiveness of this framework. On the other hand, the impact analysis and
exemptions system in the European Community system, based on social, cultural and
political criteria, in addition to the economic parameters, shows a clear interest in
achieving a harmonised common market. However, the lack of a strong antitrust tradition
in most EC Member States often results in the refusal of national competition authorities
to enforce Community law: they consider that their cultural and economic guidelines
allow them greater freedom in their decision-making.
Unlike the European Community, the antitrust tradition in the U.S. is well developed,
based fundamentally on numerous federal experiences of antitrust enforcement. While
antitrust laws may differ from state to state in their particular provisions, their relevance
on antitrust enforcement is minor, vis-à-vis the relationship between the Community
80
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bodies and the national authorities. Nevertheless, there are clearly defined guidelines that
allow states to identify and pursue their interest as a group, even when they are at odds
with the actors at federal level. Thus, the relationship between EC level and national level
must be observed differently than the relationship between federal and state level in U.S.:
the first relies on the preemption of the Commission to act, but the national authorities
still have a large amount of independence and reliability on their national systems; the
second adopts preemption in most of the cases, with rare intervention of state authorities,
due to the importance of regulating interstate trade. Even if state antitrust laws in U.S.
have been important in history, their relevance for federal activity on antitrust
enforcement at the present time is limited.
However, Europe has pursued for a long time the efficiency in its procedures. In the last
years, decentralization has been the main topic of discussion in competition documents
the Commission has prepared. This approach has been motivated by the need to find
solutions to the excessive caseload of the competition Directorate General (DG IV),
generated in large measure by its notification system. Thus, the Commission views
decentralized enforcement by national authorities and the courts as a way to cope with the
problem. In fact, the White Paper on Modernization of EC competition law is considered
by many scholars the most concrete document at this moment, and reflects clearly the
needs of the European system.
The exchange of information among the different authorities in the U.S. system has
proved to be effective enough to attain positive results in the enforcement of competition.
Since legal certainty has been a core element in U.S. antitrust dynamics, information
exchange avoids the risk to reduce the rights of the parties during the procedures At this
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point, is desirable for the EC to increase its efforts in constructing an effective system for
the exchange of information, between Community and the national competition
authorities. The creation of offices of the Commission in each country, or the use of
national authorities as such bodies, will render the process much more effective at the
Community level.
Furthermore, the EC can promote collaboration efforts between the Commission and
national enforcers, in a similar way the NAAG and the federal enforcers in the U.S.
system interact. Joint investigations, joint filings, new systems for sharing information,
and institutional innovations will provide a new era of cooperation between the two
levels of Community law enforcement. The creation of an association of heads of
national competition authorities will provide the EC with a forum for developing
important proposals, and identifying areas of common interest, which do not involve the
Commission. Furthermore, the creation of a regional court system could provide the
capability to consider not only competition cases brought under Community law, but also
those brought under national law. These regional courts would be judiciary bodies
resembling in structure and functioning to the ECJ and CFI, with Community level
authority to hear, decide and enforce competition law cases with Community interest.
The modernization process in EC competition law is one of the most important tasks,
among several others, that the Community will face in the short term. The
interdependence of the various issues with the accomplishment of the Common Market
makes the competition modernization a necessity. Among the numerous EC common
policies, such as enlargement of the EU, the single European currency, regional
development and support, and external relations with third countries, competition
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regulation represents nowadays more than a common policy to attain certain purposes: it
has become a fundamental end and no longer a means for the EC, due to the importance
of interstate trade among Member States.
Finally, if the EC has the intention and possibility of extending the reach of its
competition policy to third countries, under the “Community effect” principle, it must
strengthen its institutions and procedures. Even if the extraterritorial application of
Community competition law is a necessity nowadays for the EC Member States, there are
elements restraining this purpose. The lack of identification as part of a Community
enforcement system inside the EC Member States can is a contradiction with Community
goals that must be avoided gradually and definitely.
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